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NOTE
ENGLISH CHILD CUSTODY LAW, 1660-1839: THE
ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN
PATERNAL CUSTODY
Sarah Abramowicz
Many legal historians see pre-1839 English child custody law as consisting of near-absolutepaternal rights. These historians believe that the
weakening of fathers' rights began with the 1839 Custody of Infants Act,
which created certain maternal custody rights. Other historianshave noted
that paternalcustody was qualified even before 1839 by the Court of Chancerys applicationof the doctrine ofparens patriae. This Note tells a different story and argues that the origin of incursionsinto the so-called "empire of
the father" was the 1660 Tenures Abolition Act, a statute that ironically
seemed designed to strengthenfathers' rights.
The Tenures Abolition Act grantedfathers the right to appointguardians to their children by will. According to Blackstone, the effect of the Act
was to extend the father's empire "even after his death." But by involving
courts in child custody-even as enforcers of fathers' rights-the Tenures
Abolition Act created a traditionofjudicial intervention that would eventually undermine those rights. This Note traces the development from 1660 to
1839 whereby courtsupervision of testamentaryguardiansled to court supervision offathers themselves, transformingthe "empire of the father" into the
empire of the judge.
INTRODUCTION

The legal power of a father,-for a mother, as such, is entitled to no power, but only to reverence and respect; the power
of a father, I say, over the persons of his children ceases at the
age of twenty-one: for they are then enfranchised by arriving at
years of discretion, or that point which the law has established,
as some must necessarily be established, when the empire of the
father, or other guardian, gives place to the empire of reason.
Yet, till that age arrives, this empire of the father continues even
after his death; for he may by his will appoint a guardian to his
children.'
In his authoritative pronouncement on English law, William Blackstone describes custody of children under the age of twenty-one as "the
empire of the father." Blackstone advances as evidence of this empire
that a father could appoint a guardian to his children by his will, thereby
continuing his power "even after his death." But just as Blackstone was
formulating his version of the father's empire, the doctrine he produces
1. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *453.
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as evidence of its absolute nature was developing into authority for judges
to intervene in paternal custody even during a father's lifetime.
The father's right to appoint a guardian to his children by will
originated with a 1660 statute. From 1660 to the time of Blackstone, the
English Court of Chancery had built a tradition of supervising these father-appointed guardians, known as testamentary guardians. Beginning
in the mid-eighteenth century period when Blackstone wrote and culminating in the decades after his death, the Court of Chancery employed an
analogy between testamentary guardians and fathers to extend itsjurisdiction to include the supervision of fathers themselves.
As this Note will recount, some scholars have, like Blackstone, seen
paternal rights as absolute under English law until the passage of an 1839
statute that created certain maternal custody rights. Others have noted
the extent to which the "empire of the father" was qualified even before
1839. But no scholar has observed the irony that the origin of incursions
into this empire was the father's acquisition of the right to appoint testamentary guardians. Once the father was granted a means of extending
his power through legal instrument, judicial interpretation and discretion
seeped into his empire. And once judicial discretion entered, even
though initially in the guise of strengthening paternal rights, the empire
of child custody was no longer the father's, but that of the judge.
This Note offers a revised version of the history of English child custody law from 1660 to 1839.2 Part I analyzes the accounts of this history
given by both modern scholars and pre-twentieth-century activists and
commentators. In simplifying the law of child custody, either to the "empire of the father" or to an issue of Chancery's jurisdiction, these accounts miss the full story of the Court of Chancery's power to intervene
in paternal custody. Part II begins to tell this story, by explaining how the
advent of testamentary guardianships led to considerable discretion by
Chancery. Finally, Part III explains how this power extended from the
regulation of such guardianships to the regulation of fathers themselves.
It documents, in short, that the "empire of the father" fell, and that its fall
originated, not with the 1839 statute meant to weaken paternal rights, but
with the 1660 statute meant to strengthen them.
I. PREVALNG VIEws

OF THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH CHILD CUSTODY LAW

This Part critically assesses prior treatments of the pre-1839 history of
judicial intervention in paternal custody. No modern scholar has focused
exclusively on this history, and those who have discussed the subject in
tangents to other explorations have made critical omissions. Without yet
2. The English law of child custody described here pertains only to legitimate
children. A history of the entirely different set of laws that pertained to the custody of
illegitimate children is beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion of the custody laws
relating to illegitimate children, and of illegitimacy generally under English law, see
generally jenny Teichman, Illegitimacy: An Examination of Bastardy (1982).
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revealing the full story, this Part explains what those omissions are and
shows how similar gaps existed in pre-twentieth-century advocacy and
scholarship.
A. Twentieth-Century Accounts

The history of English child custody law is only beginning to receive
adequate treatment by legal scholars. The child custody legislation of
1839 has recently begun to attract interest, especially among feminists.3
The history of English child custody law prior to 1839 has yet to receive
similar attention. 4 To the extent that scholars have approached this history, they have done so from two very different, but equally limited,
perspectives.
The first mode of discussing the pre-1839 history of English child
custody law, the more prevalent one in recent years, has been to recount
this history in order to provide background for a history of American
family law. The second mode, popular until the early 1970s, has been to
trace the history of parens patriae, the ancient English doctrine that the
King, as the father of the nation, has the power to act in protection of the
nation's weak and powerless, namely infants, idiots, and lunatics. Today,
in both the United States and England, parenspatriaeis used in a variety
ill5 to the law of juvenile
of contexts, from protection of the mentally R
3. Two recent articles discuss the passage of England's first Custody of Infants Act in
1839. See Martha J. Bailey, England's First Custody of Infants Act, 20 Queen's LJ. 391
(1995); Dorothy E. Zaborszky, Domestic Anarchy and the Destruction of the Family:
Caroline Norton and the Custody of Infants Bill, 7 Int'l J. Women's Stud. 397 (1989).
Several scholars who trace the emergence of women's rights in England also mention the
1839 Custody of Infants Act, discussing Caroline Norton's role in bringing about that Act
as an early example of feminist activism. See Lee Holcombe, Wives & Property 50-57
(1983);Joan Perkin, Women and Marriage in Nineteenth-Century England 26-27 (1989);
Mary Lyndon Shanley, Feminism, Marriage, and the Law in Victorian England, 1850-1895,
at 23-26, 136-37 (1989). The passage of the 1839 Custody of Infants Act is also discussed
by Susan Maidment as she traces the creation of maternal custody rights in English child
custody legislation from 1839 to 1973. See Susan Maidment, Child Custody and Divorce
107-43 (1984).
4. An excellent history of English child custody law from 1839 onward is Susan
Maidment's Child Custody and Divorce, supra note 3. Taking as her starting point the
1839 Custody of Infants Act, Maidment investigates the interplay between legislation and
case law as well as between the two principles that emerged out of that interplay, namely,
the "welfare principle," that is, the best interests of the child test, see id. at 89-107, and the
principle of maternal rights, see id. at 107-49. Although she does briefly describe the state
of the law in 1839 regarding both the welfare principle, see id. at 93-95, and maternal
rights, see id. at 110-13, Maidment frames her discussion of the pre-1839 history in terms
of post-1839 developments.
5. In its modem British incarnation, parenspatriaeallows the state to exercise a greater
control over children than parents themselves can exercise, thus justifying, for example,
the enforced sterilization of a mentally disabled fourteen-year-old girl. SeeJohn Seymour,
Parens Patriae and Wardship Powers: Their Nature and Origins, 14 OxfordJ. Legal Stud.
159, 159-62, 178-87 (1994).
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courts,6 in order tojustify the state's power to intervene. Scholars exploring the scope of this doctrine have had occasion to examine its history.
Both groups of scholars emphasize particular aspects of English child
custody law and omit other, equally significant aspects, thus painting a
misleading picture of the law as a whole. The first group examines only
one small subset of child custody cases, and it is the cases they exclude
that defined the contours of the English courts' power to control paternal custody. The second group emphasizes the issue of Chancery's jurisdiction at the expense of a discussion of the development of the substantive law. This Section will discuss these accounts in turn.
1. HistoriansofAmericanFamily Law. - Michael Grossberg 7 and Mary
Ann Mason 8 have recently published important works on the history of
American family law.9 In the sections of their works dealing with child
custody law, both Grossberg and Mason argue that under the system of
English law inherited by the colonies, and followed by American courts
well into the 1800s, the father had an absolute right to the custody of his
children. Grossberg and Mason use this characterization of English legal
history to show how nineteenth-century American law diverged from its
British counterpart. Under this analysis, the American courts acted
throughout the nineteenth century to replace the British system of paternal rights with a judicial discretion that focused on maternal rights and
the best interests of the child.
This characterization of British law as consisting of absolute paternal
rights is an incomplete one that serves more as a foil for Grossberg's and
Mason's arguments about American law than as an adequate picture of
the English law of child custody. Grossberg, for example, states that the
English Court of Chancery, beginning in the seventeenth century, devel6. The doctrine of parenspatriaebecame of sudden interest to American legal scholars
in the years following the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
27-28 (1967) (holding that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies
to proceedings in juvenile court), which questioned the extent to which juvenile courts
had formerly relied upon parenspatriaeto avoid giving due process rights to minors. Parens
patriaewas, in the years prior to Gault, the predominant justification of the power of the
state to control children in the juvenile courts. For an early discussion of the use of parens
patriae to justify the system of the juvenile courts, see generally George Rossman, Parens
Patriae, 4 Or. L Rev. 233 (1925). For articles that revisited the subject in the wake of the
1967 decision, see George B. Curds, The Checkered Career of ParensPatriae The State as
Parent or Tyrant?, 25 DePaul L. Rev. 895 (1976); Douglas Rendleman, Parens Patriae:
From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 22 S.C. L Rev. 205 (1970).
7. Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth (1985) [hereinafter Grossberg,
Governing].
8. Mary Ann Mason, From Father's Property to Children's Rights (1994).
9. Another recent work is Michael Grossberg, A Judgment for Solomon (1996)
[hereinafter Grossberg, Judgment], an account of an American child custody battle in
1840. Prior to Grossberg's Governing the Hearth, scholarly attention to the history of
American child custody law was rare. SeeJamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern
American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1038, 1038 (1979) ("The history of American fhmily law is largely unwritten.").
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oped a doctrine called parenspatriaewhich allowed it to interfere in paternal rights, but does not cite any instance of the English application of this
doctrine. 10 He goes on to assert that "[t]he development ofparenspatriae
into a means of challenging paternal custody rights went on more rapidly
and fully in North America."" Grossberg does not cite any English case
to support his assertion that the challenge to paternal rights progressed
more rapidly in the United States than it did in England. Nor does he
cite any cases to demonstrate his next claim, that it was in the American
case law that "a father's custody power evolved from a property right to a
trust tied to his responsibility as guardian."1 2 Grossberg describes the notion that fatherhood is a trust as an American innovation, one that he
enlists in support of his thesis as "yet another example of the antipatriarchal ethos embedded in republican family law.' 3 As this Note will
argue, the notion that fatherhood is a trust was no American innovation,
14
but in fact existed in England as early as the eighteenth century.
In addition to giving short shrift to the decisions of the English
Court of Chancery, Grossberg and Mason further miss an opportunity to
identify the true nature of English child custody law in their discussions
of decisions made by English common law courts regarding child custody. 15 The focus on English common law cases is an understandable
one, because the early American child custody cases, to the extent that
they cited English precedents, cited those cases rather than the decisions
of the Court of Chancery. 16 But neither Grossberg nor Mason notes this
fact. As a result, what emerges from their analysis is a skewed picture of
English child custody law. When a suit regarding the custody of a child
was brought at an English court of common law, usually in the form of a
habeas corpus petition asking for the delivery of the child, the court
could only enforce, or in certain cases refuse to enforce, existing custody
rights, but could not change them. 17 When Grossberg and Mason discuss
10.
11.
12.
13.

Grossberg, Governing, supra note 7, at 236.
Id. For a similar argument, see Mason, supra note 8, at 58 (citing Grossberg).
Grossberg, Governing, supra note 7, at 236.
Id. at 236-37. Mason agrees that nineteenth-century American child custody law

shifted away from a notion of custody as a father's property right toward a more childcentered standard, but places her explanatory emphasis on the emergence of a cult of
motherhood. Mason, supra note 8, at 49-83.
14. See infra Parts II & III.
15. See Grossberg, Governing, supra note 7, at 237 & 381 n.7; Grossberg, Judgment,
supra note 9, at 52-53; Mason, supra note 8, at 59.
16. This can be explained by the fact that in nineteenth-century America, in contrast
to England, most child custody cases were heard by courts of common law rather than by
courts of chancery. See Lewis Hochheiner, The Law Relating to the Custody of Infants
27-28 (Baltimore, Harold B. Scrimger 1899) (1891) ("[T]he occasions for the
interposition of chancery in matters of guardianship are here comparatively rare. .. ").
17. Fathers and other legal guardians frequently sought to recover the custody of
children by bringing a writ of habeas corpus in a court of common law. At first, courts
were uncertain how to respond to a writ of habeas corpus brought by a child's guardian,
since the traditional purpose of the writ is to free a person from improper restraint, not to
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English common law cases, they fail to mention that the reason these
cases refused to alter the right of custody was that to do so was the sole
8
prerogative of the Court of Chancery.'
The misleading nature of the account of English child custody law
provided by Grossberg and Mason is exemplified by their treatment of
the case of de Manneville. The de Manneville case was heard twice, first in
the Court of King's Bench, a court of common law, as Rex v. de Manneville,19 then in the Court of Chancery, as de Manneville v. de Manneville.2 0 Both Grossberg and Mason discuss only the version of de Manneville decided by the Court of King's Bench. 2 1 Rex v. de Manneville was
deliver the person from one custodian to another. In the early case of Rex v. Johnson, the
court "doubted whether they should go any further than to see [the child] was under no
illegal restraint," but decided that in "the case of a young child, who had no judgment of
her own, they ought to deliver her to her guardian...." Rex v.Johnson, 93 Eng. Rep. 711,
712 (K.B. 1724). A decade later, Rex v. Smith overruled Johnson and held that, even in the
case of a child, a court presented with a writ of habeas corpus could do no more than set a
person at liberty. See Rex v. Smith, 93 Eng. Rep. 983 (K.B. 1734) (ordering a fourteenyear-old boy released from the custody of his aunt, but refusing to deliver him to his
father). Then, in Rex v. Delaval, Lord Mansfield synthesizedJohnson and Smith to set forth
the rule that upon a habeas corpus petition concerning a child, the court was only
required to set the child at liberty from improper restraint, but could decide, at its
discretion, whether or not to deliver the child into the hands of the legal guardian. See
Rex v. Delaval, 97 Eng. Rep. 913 (K.B. 1763) (refusing to deliver child into father's
custody).

Often third parties without legal rights to the custody of a child-usually, motherswould bring a writ of habeas corpus asking for the child to be delivered into their custody.
In these cases, the courts refused to order the child removed from the guardian with the
legal right to custody, on the ground that it could not interfere with that legal right. See
Rex v. de Manneville, 102 Eng. Rep. 1054 (LB. 1804); see also Ex parte Skinner, 27 Rev.
Rep. 710 (C.P. 1824) (refusing mother's petition, upon writ of habeas corpus, for the
custody of her six-year-old child, who had been placed by her father at the home of his
mistress); Ex parte McClellan, 1 Dowl. P.C. 81 (K.B. 1830) (refusing mother's petition,
upon writ of habeas corpus, for the custody of her child, who was very in and had been
placed by her father at a boarding school).
18. The tendency of American legal historians to read English precedents cited by
American courts as the whole of English child custody law seems to have originated with
Zainaldin, supra note 9, who in several footnotes provides the germ of the version of
English law repeated by Grossberg and Mason. See id. at 1053-54 n.48, 1060-61 n.77,
1063-64 n.97. Zainaldin traces the history of English cases involving a habeas corpus
petition for the delivery of an infant. His theory is that Mansfield liberalized the habeas
corpus tradition by allowing a judge to refuse rights to a father, but that after the French
revolution, the English judiciary became more conservative, and began in cases such as Rex
v. de Mannevile to retreat from the precedent of such cases as Delaval, once again refusing
to decide the issue of custody upon a writ of habeas corpus. Zainaldin may well be correct
as far as habeas is concerned, but as a history of child custody cases in general, his account
is incomplete, as it does not mention the line of cases that developed simultaneously with
the developments he discusses, where the Court of Chancery extended its power to remove
children from the custody of their fathers.
19. 102 Eng. Rep. 1054 (KB. 1804).
20. 32 Eng. Rep. 762 (Ch. 1804).
21. See Grossberg, Judgment, supra note 9, at 53; Mason, supra note 8, at 59.
Confusingly, both Grossberg and Mason not only f to note the fact that there were two
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initiated by a writ of habeas corpus fied by the mother asking for the
delivery of her infant child from the hands of its father, who, she claimed,
had taken the child from her by force. The court ordered the child delivered up for examination, determined that it was not in danger of any
harm, and returned it to the father, on the basis that "he having the legal
right to the custody of his child, and not having abused that right, is entifled to have it restored to him." 2
Looked at in isolation, Rex v. de Manneville indeed seems to demonstrate, as Mason puts it, "the doctrine of a father's paramount right to his
children." 23 But had Mason and Grossberg examined the subsequent decision of de Manneville v. de Manneville, heard in Chancery, they would
have found a very different interpretation of the basis for Rex v. de Manneville's refusal to deny a father the custody of his child:
The Court of King's Bench, when the child was brought up by
Habeas Corpus, declined to interfere; and I am not surprised at it;
for that Court has not within it by its constitution any of that
species of delegated authority, that exists in the King, as Parens
24
Patriae;and resides in this Court, as representing his Majesty.

The Court of King's Bench could not alter a father's right of custody,
because the authority to do so was vested only in the Court of Chancery.
As this Note will discuss below,2 5 de Manneville v. de Manneville in fact

expanded the discretionary power of the Court of Chancery to abrogate a
father's right to the custody of his child.
2. Historians of Parens Patriae. - Historians of parens patriae subsume the historical development of child custody law under a larger exploration of that doctrine. Neil Cogan, 26 Lawrence Custer,27 and John
Seymour 28 have traced the development of parenspatriae into a doctrine
that justifies state interference between parent and child. In doing so,
de Manneville cases, but also provide an incorrect citation for the version of de Manneville

that they do discuss. It is clear from their discussions of the holding of the case, as well as
from the fact that they both name the deciding judge as Lord Ellenborough (who decided
Rex v. de Mannevifle), that both Grossberg and Mason are referring, not to the Chancery
decision of de Manneville v. de Mannevlle, 32 Eng. Rep. 762 (Ch. 1804), but rather, to the
King's Bench decision of Rex v. de Manneille, 102 Eng. Rep. 1054 (KIB. 1804). However,
Grossberg names his case as "DeManneville v. DeManneuile" and cites to "32 Eng. Reps. 762
(Ch., 1804)." Grossberg, Judgment, supra note 9, at 250 n.44. Meanwhile Mason, though
correctly identifying the case she discusses as "Rex v. De Manneville," similarly provides the
citation not to Rex v. de Manneville but to de Mannevile v. de Manneville, "32 Eng. Rep. 762
(Ch. 1804)." Mason, supra note 8, at 59 & 204 n.45.
22. Rex v. de Mannevilie, 102 Eng. Rep. at 1055.
23. Mason, supra note 8, at 59.
24. De Manneville v. de Manneville, 32 Eng. Rep. at 765.
25. See infra Part III.C.2.
26. See Neil Howard Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of "Parens
Patriae," 22 S.C. L. Rev. 147 (1970).
27. See Lawrence Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of ParensPatriae,27 Emory L.J.
195 (1978).
28. See Seymour, supra note 5.
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they overemphasize the relevance of parenspatriae in early child custody
cases, concluding that child custody law originated with parens patriae.
Although Cogan, Custer, and Seymour do mention testamentary guardianships, they treat them as an incidental element of, rather than the
driving force behind, the cases employing parenspatriae.29 The modem
version of parenspatriaemay have emerged in the context of English child
custody law, but English child custody law did not grow out of parenspatriae. To the contrary, the parens patriae doctrine was relevant to child
custody primarily in that it gave the Court of Chancery jurisdiction to
regulate testamentary guardianships.
The history of parenspatriaeprovided by Cogan, Custer, and Seymour
traces its extension to justify the Court of Chancery's regulation of testamentary guardians in three early cases:30 Falklandv. Bertie in 1696,31 Eyre
v. Shaftsbuty in 1722,32 and Shaftsbuy v. Shaftsbury in 1725. 33 A careful
reading of these cases reveals that, while the courts were not as meticulous in separating their analyses ofjurisdictional and substantive issues as
courts today, the parens patriae doctrine was of the former type in the
child custody context. The first case to mention parenspatriaein conjunc29. These authors pay varying degrees of attention to the fact that many of the early
cases they cite as establishing parenspatriaeinvolved testamentary guardianships, but none
see the testamentary guardianship itself as the origin of Chancery's jurisdiction over
paternal custody rights. Custer mentions that the Tenures Abolition Act, 12 Car. 2, ch. 24
(1660), gave fathers "the right to commit [their] children to guardianship by will," Custer,
supra note 27, at 201, and, in his discussion of Eyre v. Shaftesbury, 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (Ch.
1722), states that this case involved a guardian appointed by will, see Custer, supra note 27,
at 201, but does not analyze the relevance of the testamentary guardianship to the
development of parens patriae jurisdiction, or distinguish between cases involving
testamentary guardians and cases involving fathers. Both Cogan and Seymour discuss
testamentary guardianships in more detail and trace the expansion of parens patriaefrom
cases regulating testamentary guardians to cases regulating fathers themselves, but
describe this as an expansion of parenspatriae rather than as an expansion of the logic of
testamentary guardianship. See Cogan, supra note 26, at 178 (arguing that the extension
of Chancery's powers over fathers was based not on the logic of guardianship, but on the
court's parenspatriaepower); Seymour, supra note 5, at 174-76 (tracing "the expansion of
the parens patriaejurisdiction"). Seymour indeed notes that the 1660 Act establishing
testamentary guardianships "gave particular impetus to the development of Chancery's
jurisdiction over infants," id. at 172, and that the Court of Chancery's "assertion of
jurisdiction over a testamentary guardian paved the way for judicial control over a father's
excercise of his powers," id. at 175. But while Seymour recognizes that the step from
regulating testamentary guardianships to regulating fathers was a large one----"[i] t was one
thing for the Court to take action to fill the gap when the natural parent was dead, it was
quite another for it to override the views of a father"-he simply notes that "[t]his step was
taken in the eighteenth century," without explaining how or why. Id. at 175. To do so is
the project of this Note.
30. See Cogan, supra note 26, at 166-77; Custer, supra note 27, at 201-05; Seymour,
supra note 5, at 167-69.
31. 23 Eng. Rep. 814 (Ch. 1696).
32. 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (Ch. 1722).
33. 25 Eng. Rep. 121 (Ch. 1725).
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tion with infants was Falkland.34 In response to the infant petitioner's
argument that the court should overlook as overly harsh the clause in her
uncle's will conditioning her inheritance on marriage to a certain man,
the Falkland court, though ruling against her, agreed with her proposition that the Court of Chancery could interfere on behalf of infants. In
support of this proposition, it summoned up the doctrine of parens patriae, and in doing so described the doctrine as it had never been described before. Not only did Falkland rename "parenspatriae" as "pater
patriae,''35 but it also advanced the novel idea that this doctrine extended
to infants, that the portion of parens patriae relating to infants had formerly been exercised by the Court of Wards, and that upon the abolition
of the Court of Wards in 1660, the jurisdiction over infants reverted to
36
the Court of Chancery.
Falkland's statement on parens patriaewvas simply dictum. This dictum was subsequently, as Seymour describes it, "adopted as a correct
V 37
statement of the law"
by a petitioner in Eyre, who relied upon the Court
of Chancery's parens patriaejurisdiction over infants in asking it to intervene in a testamentary guardianship. 8 When the case returned to the
34. See Cogan, supra note 26, at 166; see also Custer, supra note 27, at 201.
35. See Cogan, supra note 26, at 166. The post-Falkland case law uses the two terms
interchangeably.
36. The court stated:
In this court there were several things that belonged to the King as paterpatriae,
and fell under the care and direction of this court, as charities, infants, ideots,
lunatics, &c., afterwards such of them as were of profit and advantage to the King,
were removed to the Court of Wards by the statute; but upon the dissolution of
that court, came back again to the Chancery ....
Falkland,23 Eng. Rep. at 818. As Custer observes, "The Lord Chancellor cited no authority
for these statements... if he had any case authority he did not mention it." Custer, supra
note 27, at 202.
37. Seymour, supra note 5, at 167; see also Custer, supra note 27, at 204
("Thereafter... Eyre v. Shaftsbury became the precedent for upholding the crown's and
consequently the equity court's protective authority over minors.").
Both Custer and Seymour overstate the importance of parenspatriaeto the decision in
Eyre. While the petitioner in Eyre referred to the Court of Chancery's parenspatriae power
in arguing that the court had jurisdiction to interfere in a testamentary guardianship, see
Eyre, 24 Eng. Rep. at 659, discussed infra at note 38, and the court implicitly accepted this
argument by deciding that it could so interfere, the Eyre court itself did not mention parens
patriae. But Custer and Seymour claim that the Eyre court itself referred to parenspatriaeas
a basis for its decision. See Custer, supra note 27, at 202-04; Seymour, supra note 5, at
167, 169. The confusion stems from the fact that an account of the Court of Chancery's
reconsideration of Eyre in the later case of Shaftsbury v. Shaftsbury-which did make direct
mention of parenspatriae-isappended to the report of Eyre, see 24 Eng. Rep. 661-66 (a
separately published (and differently authored) report of Shafsbuiy itself appears at 25
Eng. Rep. 121). The passages that Custer and Seymour attribute to Eyre as relying on
parenspatfiaeare in fact from the 1725 reconsideration of Eyre in Shaftsbury, as described by
the reporter of Eyre.
38. See Eyre, 24 Eng. Rep. at 659. Eyre involved a mother who disputed the legitimacy
of her child's testamentary guardian (on the technical ground that since the guardianship
had been appointed to three, it became defunct upon the death of any one of those
three), and in the alternative asked the court to prevent that guardian from removing the
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Court of Chancery three years later in Shaflsbury v. Shaftsbury, the court
itself referred to parenspatriae as ajustification for its authority over testamentary guardianships, thereby reaffirming the Court of Chancery's jurisdiction to care for the nation's infants in its role as parenspatriae.3 9 As the
historians of parenspatriae demonstrate, in the years following Shaftsbuy,
the Court of Chancery continued to refer to its parens patriaepower in
cases involving the regulation of testamentary guardians, 40 and again in
41
cases extending this regulation to fathers.
By reading the history of child custody law through the lens of parens
patriae,historians take one aspect of the child custody legal regime for
the whole. They therefore downplay the importance not only of the actual context in which cases involving child custody disputes emergedthe regulation of testamentary guardianships 42-but also the guiding notion by which the courts intervened in these disputes, that is, the notion
that guardianship is a trust. 43 The opening statement of the decision in
Eyre demonstrates both the centrality to the court's decision of the notion
child from her home and from interfering in her management of his education, arguing
that "it was in the discretion of the Court" to do so. Id. The Court of Chancery ruled
against the mother's argument that the guardianship was invalid, but agreed that it had the
power to regulate testamentary guardianships, which it did in this case by deciding that the
guardian could remove the child during the daytime and manage his education, but must
return him to his mother every night. See id. at 660.
39. See Shaftsbury v. Shaftsbury, 25 Eng. Rep. 121, 121-22 (Ch. 1725); see also the
version of Shaftsbuty reported at 24 Eng. Rep. 659, 664 (citing Falklandas authority for the
proposition that "the care of all infants is lodged in the King as paterpatriae,and by the
King this care is delegated to his Court of Chancery").
Shaftsbury also supported its use of parenspatriaein the context of infants by citing the
1603 precedent of Beverley's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1118 (K.B. 1603). Custer demonstrates that
this use of precedent is based upon a printer's error. Beverley's Case concerned an attempt
to avoid a debt on the grounds of mental incompetence. In upholding its jurisdiction to
act in protection of the petitioner, the Beverley court referred to its power, delegated by the
Crown, to act in protection of "idiots and lunatics." In the 1658 reprint of Beverley in
Coke's Reports, the printer mistakenly changed "idiot" to "infant." See Custer, supra note
27, at 203-05. Custer describes the use of Beverley's Case by Shaftsbury (which Custer
mistakenly cites as Eyre, see supra note 37) as evidence that the Lord Chancellor deciding
Shaftsbury "knew he was treading on dangerous precedental ground" in extending parens
patriae to encompass the protection of infants. Id. at 204.
With Shaftsbuy, as Custer puts it, "[tihe parens patriae power was thereafter
entrenched." Id. at 205.
40. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 26 Eng. Rep. 977 (Ch. 1745) (cited by Cogan, supra note
26, at 177-78).
41. See, e.g., Wellesleyv. Beaufort, 38 Eng. Rep. 236, 243 (Ch. 1827) (cited by Cogan,
supra note 26, at 179-81; Custer, supra note 27, at 207; Seymour, supra note 5, at 175-76);
de Manneville v. de Manneville, 32 Eng. Rep. 762, 767 (Ch. 1804) (cited by Cogan, supra
note 26, at 180; Custer, supra note 27, at 206; Seymour, supra note 5, at 172).
42. See supra note 29.
43. Seymour mentions the theory, raised in the eighteenth century, that Chancery's
jurisdiction over guardianship originated in, and was modelled on, the law of trusts, and
follows the eighteenth-century scholars in dismissing this theory. See Seymour, supra note
5, at 166-67. For a discussion of the eighteenth-century dismissal of the trust theory of
guardianship, see infta Part I.B.2.
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that guardianship is a trust and the connection between this notion and
the newly established testamentary guardianships:
The father by the statute has a right to dispose of the guardianship of his child until twenty-one, and having done so here, it
will be binding, unless some misbehaviour be shown in the
guardian, in which case it being a matter of trust, this court has
a superintendency over it. 44
The issue in Eyre was the court's power to regulate and enforce the
new testamentary guardianships created by the 1660 statute. The mode
in which Eyre approached its regulation of these testamentary guardianships was to treat them as trusts. The court had power vis-a-vis the guardian because the guardian was a trustee, and as such invited judicial intervention whenever he failed to properly execute his trust.45
Thus, the necessary element ofjudicial intervention in testamentary
guardianships was not parens patriae, but the idea of guardianship as a
trust. The parens patriaeargument served only to explain why the Court
of Chancery, as opposed to another court, should have the jurisdiction
over guardianships. 46 Even before Falkland advanced the parens patriae
theory, courts had undertaken the regulation of testamentary guardianships, and had done so on the theory that guardianship is a trust. In
1668, in Bedell v. Constable,4 7 the Court of Common Pleas heard a dispute
involving the appointment of a testamentary guardian. 48 Throughout its
44. Eyre, 24 Eng. Rep. at 660 (citation omitted). Forty years later, William Blackstone
would describe the regulation of guardianships in much the same terms:
[T]he lord chancellor is, by right derived from the crown, the general and
supreme guardian of all infants, as well as idiots and lunatics; that is, of all such
persons as have not discretion enough to manage their own concerns. In case
therefore any guardian abuses his trust, the court will check and punish him; nay
sometimes will proceed to the removal of him, and appoint another in his stead.
1 Blackstone, supra note 1, at *463.
45. Similarly, the Court of Chancery had held a year earlier, in Beaufort v. Berty, that
guardians appointed by will under the Tenures Abolition Act were trustees, and as such
subject to the control of the Court of Chancery. See Beaufort v. Berty, 24 Eng. Rep. 579,
579 (Ch. 1721).
46. A useful demonstration of the relationship between the Court of Chancery's
parenspatriaepowers-which helped tojustify its jurisdiction over guardianships-and the
notion of guardianship as a trust-which justified its use of discretion in regulating and
enforcing those guardianships-is provided by the argument of the petitioner in Eyre.
It was... urged, that this was a matter of trust, for every guardianship was a trust;
that the Crown, as parenspatriae,was the supreme guardian and superintendent
over all infants; and since this was a trust, it was consequently in the discretion of
the Court, whether or no they would do so hard a thing, as to take away an infant
under thirteen years of age, from so careful a mother ....
Eyre, 24 Eng. Rep. at 659 (citations omitted).
47. 124 Eng. Rep. 1026 (C.P. 1668).
48. The case involved a dispute between the person who would ordinarily be the
guardian in socage, see infra Part IIA, and the guardian appointed by the father, where
the father had devised the "custody and tuition of his heir" but did not specifically dispose
of his property. Id. at 1026. Since the land and the custody of the heir traditionally fell to
the same person, the court needed to determine whether "the land follows the custody," by
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decision, Bedell referred to the notion that guardianship is a trust.4 9 The
difference between Bedell and Shaftsbuiy was that whereas Bedell was heard
in the Court of Common Pleas, Shaflsbuiy claimed the regulation of
guardianships as the special prerogative of the Court of Chancery, and
justified this jurisdictional grant by referring to the Court of Chancery's
power of parens patriae.5 0 In the child custody cases that ensued, some
decisions reiterated Chancery's special role as parenspatriae,5 ' and others
disputed that this role encompassed a jurisdiction over infants. 52 But
whenever the Court of Chancery's ability to interfere with a guardian's
rights was put into question, it rested its power to remove a guardian who
mismanaged the care of a ward on the basis that a guardian was but a
53
trustee, and as such subject to judicial supervision.
B. EarlierAccounts
That the histories of English child custody law provided by twentiethcentury scholars emphasize certain aspects of that history at the expense
of others should perhaps not be surprising, because, as this Section ill
now show, similar distortions were present in earlier tellings of the same
story. Consistent with the American historians' belief that English child
custody law afforded absolute paternal rights was a nineteenth-century
which both would go to the testamentary guardian, or "the custody follows the land," by
which both would go to the guardian in socage. Id. at 1026. The court manifested its
discomfort with the new testamentary guardianship by ruling for the guardian in socage on
the ground that the appointment of the testamentary guardian was void because the father
had not named any specific age at which the guardianship was to terminate. See id. at
1030.
49. See, e.g., id. at 1028 ("And a more near or tenderer trust cannot be, than the
custody and education of a mans [sic] child and heir, and the preservation of his estate.").
Bedell was one of the first printed cases to interpret the Tenures Abolition Act, 12 Car. 2,
ch. 24 (1660), and seemed repeatedly troubled by the unprecedented nature of the
situations created by the Act. Bedell referred to both the guardianship in socage and the
testamentary guardianship as a trust, and primarily used the notion of "trust" to reject the
idea that a guardianship could be lightly conferred or transferred, complaining that in
making the trust of guardianship subject to change by the father's will, the new statute
allowed outcomes "contrary to the ancient and excellent policy of the law." Bedell, 124
Eng. Rep. at 1029.
50. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
51. See Butler v. Freeman, 27 Eng. Rep. 204, 204 (Ch. 1756).
52. See Ex parte Whitfield, 26 Eng. Rep. 592, 592-93 (Ch. 1742).
53. See Beaufort v. Berty, 24 Eng. Rep. 579, 579 (Ch. 1721) ("Guardians [appointed
by will under the Tenures Abolition Act] were but trustees ... and as the Court would
interpose, where the estate of a man was devised in trust, so would it a fortiori concern
itself, on the custody of a child's being devised to a guardian .... ."); Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 24
Eng. Rep. 659, 660 (Ch. 1722); Morgan v. Dillon, 88 Eng. Rep. 361, 365-66 (Ch. 1724)
(removing testamentary guardian for breach of trust); Goodall v. Harris, 24 Eng. Rep. 862,
862-63 (Ch. 1729) (removing testamentary guardian for breach of trust); see also
Wellesley v. Wellesley, 4 Eng. Rep. 1078, 1081 (H.L. 1828) (upholding the Court of
Chancery's power to remove a father for breach of trust by reasoning, "why is the conduct
of the father not to be considered a trust, as well as the conduct of a person appointed as
guardian?").
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effort that mischaracterized that law in an effort to obtain rights for
mothers. And consistent with the parens patriae scholars' emphasis on
that doctrine was a debate in the late eighteenth century about the source
of the Court of Chancery's jurisdiction over fathers.
1. MaternalRights Advocacy and the Myth of Absolute PaternalRights. The crystallization into accepted truth of Blackstone's notion that English
fathers had absolute rights to the custody of their children began in nineteenth-century England with the advent of agitation for maternal rights.
As marital dissolution became increasingly common at the beginning of
the nineteenth century, 54 more and more cases emerged in which
mothers competed with fathers for the custody of their children. The
view that fathers had absolute rights to the custody of their children grew
out of these cases: first, in the jurisprudence itself, which repeatedly rejected maternal rights as a sufficient basis for the removal of children
from their fathers, and second, in the treatment of these cases in the
influential writings of Caroline Norton, whose crusade for the creation of
maternal custody rights resulted in the passage of the 1839 Custody of
Infants Act.
a. The Lack ofMaternal Rights Before 1839. - Prior to 1804, the Court
of Chancery regularly granted mothers' requests to restrain fathers from
interfering with the custody of their children. 55 The basis of these decisions was never that the mother had a right to the custody of her child
superseding the right of the father, but rather that the father had lost his
54. See Lawrence Stone, Road to Divorce 141-48, 158-59, 184-86, 325-26 (1994). In
most cases, marital dissolution was effected either de facto or by a privately arranged
separation agreement, rather than through a legally sanctioned separation or divorce. See
id. This was because, prior to the Divorce Act of 1857, 20 & 21 Vict., ch. 85, separation and
divorce were very difficult to obtain under English law. A legal separation could be
obtained from the ecclesiastical courts, but only on the grounds of adultery or cruelty, and
the costs of filing such a suit were high. In cases where the wife had committed adultery, a
full divorce could be obtained by an Act of Parliament; this was even more costly. See
Stone, supra, at 141. In the early 1800s, changing attitudes about the acceptability of
divorce ushered in an era of agitation for legal reforms that would make divorces easier to
obtain. See id. at 353-67.
For an account of the effect on women's rights of the 1857 Divorce Act, and of the
role of women in bringing about the passage of that Act as well as subsequent legislation
reforming the laws of marriage and divorce, see Shanley, supra note 3; see also Holcombe,
supra note 3. As both Shanley and Holcombe recount, Caroline Norton played an
important role in bringing about the passage of the 1857 Divorce Act. See Holcombe,
supra note 3, at 50-58; Shanley, supra note 3, at 22-48; see also Caroline Norton, English
Laws for Women in the Nineteenth Century (Hyperion Press 1981) (1854) [hereinafter
Norton, English Laws] (providing Norton's own description of her agitation on behalf of
divorce reform).
55. See Giffard v. Giffard, unreported case cited in Blisset's Case, 98 Eng. Rep. 899,
900 (KB. 1774) (granting custody to a mother, where the father was a Catholic and
bankrupt); see also Creuze v. Hunter, 30 Eng. Rep. 113 (Ch. 1790) (preventing a bankrupt
father from interfering with the mother's arrangements for the custody and education of
their children); Skinner v. Warner, 21 Eng. Rep. 473 (Ch. 1792) (ordering a bankrupt
father not to remove his children from the schools at which their mother had placed
them).
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own rights to custody.5 6 In the de Manneville v. de Manneville case of
1804,57 and in cases that followed, 58 mothers who sought the custody of
their children began to argue for this custody on the novel basis that
maternal rights superseded paternal rights. It was when custody became
an issue of competing maternal and paternal rights that judges ruled in
favor of fathers, holding that paternal custody rights are superior to maternal ones. But they never denied the superiority of judicial power to
that of fathers.
The absence of maternal custody rights was famously articulated by
Blackstone in 1765: "[A] mother, as such, is entitled to no power, but
only to reverence and respect." 59 Even in Blackstone's time, however, the

weakness of maternal rights was less extreme than his famous quote implies. Most legal scholars of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth
centuries, Blackstone included, agreed that a mother had the right to her
child when no other guardian existed to supersede her. 60 It was only
relative to other guardians-including the father and the father's appointed guardian-that the mother had no enforceable custody rights.
In de Manneville, a mother petitioning for the custody of her infant
daughter advanced the argument that "children of such a tender age...
cannot without great danger be separated from the mother."6 1 The Lord
Chancellor hearing de Manneville refused even to consider the theory that
children belong with their mothers-"I do not mean to decide, whether I
am at liberty to pay attention to the affidavit of the wife" 62-preferring
instead to proceed as if the mother's argument did not exist: "[T]he
Court will do what is for the benefit of the infant, without regard to the
56. See Giffard, cited in 98 Eng. Rep. at 900:
[T]he paternal authority as to its civil force was founded in nature, and the care
presumed which he would take for the education of the child; but if he would not
provide for its support, he abandoned his right to the custody of the child's
person, or if he would educate it in a manner forbidden by the laws of the State,
the public right of the community to superintend the education of its members,
and disallow what for its own security and welfare it should see good to disallow,
went beyond the right and authority of the father ....
57. 32 Eng. Rep. 762 (Ch. 1804). This important case will be discussed in more detail
infra Part III.C.2.
58. See cases discussed infra at notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
59. 1 Blackstone, supra note 1, at *453.
60. For a description of the "guardianship by nurture," by which both the mother and
the father, in the absence of any other species of guardianship, had the right to the custody
of their children under the age of fourteen, see Peregrine Bingham, The Law of Infancy
and Coverture 140-41 (London,J. Butterworth & Son 1816); 1 Blackstone, supra note 1, at
*461; Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England: A Commentary
upon Littleton 88b (London, W. Clarke 17th ed. 1817) (1628); John Fonblanque, A
Treatise of Equity 240 note h (London, J. & W.T. Clarke, 1820) (1794); Francis Hargrave,
Notes to Coke's Commentary upon Littleton 88b n.13 (London, W. Clarke 1817) (1787).
61. De Mannevile, 32 Eng. Rep. at 763.
62. Id. at 765.
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prayer." 63 As this Note will discuss below, 64 de Manneville in fact reaffirmed and extended the power of the Court of Chancery to interfere
with fathers' custody over their children, and even to remove children
from their fathers altogether. At the same time, however, de Manneville
emphasized that in deciding whether to abrogate paternal custody rights,
the court did not need to consult the mother's rights or desires, but only
its own discretion. In this instance, the court's discretion led it to order,
on the one hand, that the father be restrained from removing the child
out of England, 65 and on the other hand, that the child not be delivered
to the custody of the mother, since the mother had separated from her
husband without obtaining a legal separation or divorce, and to place the
66
child with her would be to condone this illegal arrangement.
As mothers in subsequent years made claims to their children on the
basis of custody rights, the Court of Chancery held repeatedly that
mothers have no right of custody against fathers. 67 Although in each of
these cases the father had behaved in a manner that might, in itself,jus-

63. Id.
64. See infra Part III.B.2.
65. See de Manneville, 32 Eng. Rep. at 768.
66. See id. at 765-66 ("This is an application by a married woman, living in a state of
actual, unauthorized, separation, to continue, as far as the removal of the child will have an
influence to continue, that separation, which I must say is not permitted by law."). Martha
Bailey argues that "it was the sanctity of marriage, not the sacred rights of fathers, that
underlay the [de Manneville] decision." See Bailey, supra note 3, at 398. As she goes on to
observe, Lord Eldon, the Lord Chancellor deciding de Manneville, would in later cases
"involving dead mothers and 'immoral' fathers... show his willingness to override fathers'
rights when separation was not in issue." Id. The cases involving "dead mothers and
'immoral' fathers" to which Bailey refers were Shelley v. Westbrooke, 37 Eng. Rep. 850
(Ch. 1817) and Wellesley v. Beaufort, 38 Eng. Rep. 236 (Ch. 1827), see id. at 398 n.20,
which are discussed infra at Part M.C.2.
67. See Ball v. Ball, 57 Eng. Rep. 703 (V.C. 1827) (rejecting a mother's petition for
the custody of, or access to, her child, submitted on the grounds of her husband's cruelty);
see also Gallini v. Galini, unreported case cited in Ball, 57 Eng. Rep. at 704 (refusing a
mother's petition to remove children from their Catholic father); Smith v. Smith, cited in
Ball, 57 Eng. Rep. at 704 (rejecting a claim that right to children under the age of seven is
vested in the mother); unreported case of Mrs. Greenhill, referred to in Rex v. Greenhill,
111 Eng. Rep. 922, 923 (KB. 1836), and discussed in more detail in Caroline Norton, The
Separation of Mother and Child by the Law of "Custody of Infants," Considered 54-73
(London, Roake & Varty 1838) [hereinafter Norton, Separation]. In the case of Mrs.
Greenhill, the Court of Chancery dismissed a mother's petition complaining that her
husband had deprived her of access to her children, on the ground that a mother did not
"as a matter of right" have a claim "even [to] see her children," let alone to her children's
custody. See Norton, Separation, supra, at 61. Norton's report of the Greenhill case is
probably an accurate one, as it was prepared with the help of Sergeant Talfourd, see id. at
33, who was the lawyer for Mr. Greenhill in the original case, see Bailey, supra note 3, at
409. Talfourd was inspired by Mrs. Greenhill's case to take up the cause of maternal
custody rights, and it was he who presented to Parliament Norton's Custody of Infants Bill.
See id.
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7
tify removal of his children-adultery, 68 irreligion, 69 crueltyT-the
mothers lost when they attempted to obtain the children on the ground
that they had a right to do so. In Ball, the court even refused to order
that a father allow his wife access to her children, holding that the court
did not have the power to interfere in a father's rights unless the father
himself lost these rights by his own misbehavior. 71 In 1836, Rex v. Greenhill7 2 articulated the reasoning behind this repeated rejection of mothers'
claims to custody rights: "[A]ny doubts left on the minds of the public as
to the right to claim the custody of children might lead to dreadful disputes."73 Although willing to remove children from fathers, the courts
were reluctant to do so where this might encourage mothers to think that
they had a right to their children's custody. Where a claim to custody was
cast as a dispute between mother and father, the rule was clear: The father's rights dominated. But the judicial process stood above both.
b. CarolineNorton and the 1839 Custody of Infants Act. - It was Caroline Norton who brought the lack of maternal custody rights to the attention of the English public. In doing so, she created the misperception
that under English law prior to 1839, fathers had absolute rights to the
custody of their children. Norton entered the world of child custody law
when she separated from her husband and he refused to allow her access

68. Compare Bal, 57 Eng. Rep. at 703 (refusing to abrogate father's rights on
grounds of adultery), with Wellesley v. Beaufort, 38 Eng. Rep. 236 (Ch. 1827) (abrogating
a father's custody rights in part due to his adultery), discussed infra Part III.B.2. It seems
that the determining factor in the difference in outcome between Ball and Wellesley was
that in Wellesley, the mother was dead, and therefore not in any danger of asserting her
maternal rights, whereas in Ball, the mother was alive.
69. Compare Gallini, cited in 57 Eng. Rep. at 704 (refusing to abrogate a father's
rights on religious grounds), with Shelley v. Westbrooke, 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (Ch. 1817)
(abrogating paternal rights on religious grounds), discussed infra Part III.B.2.
70. Compare Smith, cited in 57 Eng. Rep. at 704 (refusing to abrogate paternal rights
on grounds of cruelty toward mother, where maternal rights claimed by mother), with
Mytton v. Holyoake (Ch. 1830), unreported case cited in William Macpherson, A Treatise
on the Law Relating to Infants 110 (Philadelphia, John S. IAttell 1843) (abrogating
paternal rights on grounds of cruelty toward mother and general profligacy, and placing
children with mother, where petition brought by a third party).
71. See Ball, 57 Eng. Rep. at 704 ("Some conduct, on the part of the father, with
reference to the management and education of the child, must be shown to warrant
interference with his legal right.").
72. 111 Eng. Rep. 922 (K.B. 1836) (rejecting a mother's petition of habeas corpus to
have her children removed from the custody of their adulterous father).
73. Id. at 927. Rex v. Greenhillwas not decided in the Court of Chancery, but rather,
in the Court of the King's Bench, and, as the lawyers for both sides admitted, "[t]he power
of separating children from the father on account of immorality in him, lies in the Court
" Id. at 926. The Greenhill court, noting that the mother had already
of Chancery ....
petitioned the Court of Chancery and lost her case, decided not to base its ruling on the
fact of its limited powers, but rested instead on the "more general grounds" that in the case
of a dispute between a mother and a father, "the proper custody... undoubtedly is the
custody of the father." Id. at 927-28.
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to their three children. 74 Told by a legal advisor that she had no legal
recourse, Norton, in disbelief, read through the law books herself and
discovered that mothers in her position had been repeatedly turned away
by the courts. Rather than attempt to struggle against years of anti-maternal precedent, Norton decided to appeal directly to Parliament, and
75
drafted the bill that eventually became the Custody of Infants Act.
Passed in 1839, the Custody of Infants Act gave the Court of Chancery the
power to grant a mother the custody of her children under the age of
seven and access to her older children, provided that the mother had not
committed adultery. 76 It also opened up a new era of child custody law
77
by ushering in a tradition of Parliamentary legislation on the subject.
Norton argued for the passage of her proposed bill in two pamphlets
that she distributed to members of Parliament. 78 These pamphlets revolutionized the public perception of child custody law by reframing it as an
issue of mothers' and fathers' competing rights. Noting that whenever a
mother claimed custody against a father, the legal decisions that resulted
made "no reference to the mother's claim," but instead focused exclusively on the rights of the father, 79 Norton sets out to tell the formerly
untold aspect of child custody law, that is, the plight of the mothers
whose rights had been refused. Thus Norton transforms de Manneville v.

74. See Norton, English Laws, supra note 54, at 41-53 for Norton's autobiographical
account of her brutal treatment at the hands of her husband, and his refusal to permit her
access to her children. See also the biography of Norton by Jane Perkins, The Life of the
Honourable Mrs. Norton (1909).
75. Thus Norton decided, as she put it, to fight her situation with her pen, "'looking
to it to extricate me, as the soldier trusts to his sword to cut his way through.'" Perkins,
supra note 74, at 130 (quoting Norton); see also Norton, English Laws, supra note 54, at
49, 52; Caroline Norton, A Plain Letter to the Lord Chancellor on the Infant Custody Bill
71 (London, James Ridgeway 1839) [hereinafter Norton, Plain Letter] (published under
the pen-name "Pearce Stevenson, Esq."). For recent articles on Norton's role in the
passage of the Custody of Infants Act, see supra note 3.
76. See Custody of Infants Act, 2 & 3 Vict., ch. 54 (1839). This Act was extended to all
courts by the Judicature Act, 36 & 37 Vict., ch. 66 § 25(10) (1873).
77. The Custody of Infants Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., ch. 12, raised the age under which
children could be awarded to the mother to 16, see id. § 1, removed adultery as a bar to
maternal custody, see id. § 1, and allowed the Court of Chancery to uphold a separation
deed if it determined such deed to be "for the benefit of the infant," id. § 2. The
Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886, 49 & 50 Vict., ch. 27, allowed the court to consider both
"the conduct of the parents" and the "welfare of the infant" in making a custody
determination, id. § 5, and the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 45,
placed the mother and the father on equal footing with regard to child custody, see id. § 2,
and required that courts "shall regard the welfare of the infant as the first and paramount
consideration" in making a child custody determination, id. § 1. For an overview and
analysis of English child custody legislation from 1839 to 1925, see Maidment, supra note
3, at 89-149.
78. See Norton, Plain Letter, supra note 75; Norton, Separation, supra note 67.
79. Norton, Separation, supra note 67, at 36.
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de Manneville,80 Ball v. Ball,8 1 and Rex v. Greenhill8 2 into "Case of Mrs.
85
84
de Manneville," 83 "Case of Mrs. Ball," and "Case of Mrs. Greenhill,"
retelling each dispute over child custody from the point of view of the
mother. She details the pain every mother feels at losing the custody of
her child,8 6 and expounds on the dangerous nature of a law that in many
instances forced a mother to choose between suffering at the hands of an
87
abusive husband and losing access to her children.
As she recasts legal history from a mother's perspective, Norton remedies one imbalance in legal discussions of child custody, but at the same
time creates an imbalance of a different sort by giving the misleading
impression that fathers had absolute rights to the custody of their children. Although Norton does mention that the Court of Chancery had
upon several occasions interfered with fathers' rights, she does not describe these instances in any detail.88 More importantly, Norton presents
the cases she does describe, involving mothers' and fathers' competing
rights, as if these cases refused custody to mothers on the basis that fathers' custody rights were absolute. This is exemplified by her treatment
of de Manneville.8 9 Here Norton mentions the court order forbidding the
father from taking the child out of the jurisdiction, 90 but does not view
this as an abrogation of paternal rights. Norton focuses instead on the
court's refusal to grant custody to the mother, spinning the facts of the
case to make the decision stand for the proposition "that 'the father's
right' extends to the hour of a child's birth, and that he may tear it from
the breast of its mother, in the act of affording it the nourishment which
supports its life." 91 With its rhetoric of brutal fathers and victimized
80. 32 Eng. Rep. 762 (Ch. 1804).
81. 57 Eng. Rep. 703 (V.C. 1827).
82. 111 Eng. Rep. 922 (K.B. 1836).
83. Norton, Separation, supra note 67, at 33.
84. Id. at 49.
85. Id. at 54.
86. Norton describes in great detail "the effect on a woman's heart" of "suddenly
snapping the tenderest of ties." Id. at 16.
87. Norton frequently casts the effect on a mother of losing her children as torture,
asking, for example, "what degree of bodily agony, or bodily fear, can compare with the
inch-by-inch torture of this unnatural separation?" Id. Her argument is that this torture
can be inflicted at the will of the husbands who wish to use "the custody of their children as
a means and instrument in their hands... the forfeiture of which can be held in terrorem over
[the wife] to prevent her resisting any violence or any insult." Thus, the law of child
custody allows husbands "to rack the heart instead of the body." Norton, Plain Letter, supra
note 75, at 46.
88. See, e.g., Norton, Separation, supra note 67, at 6; Norton, English Laws, supra
note 54, at 22.
89. See Norton, Separation, supra note 67, at 33-37. For a discussion of
de Mannevie, see supra text accompanying notes 19-25; infra Part IIIA.2.
90. See Norton, Separation, supra note 67, at 36.
91. Id. at 37.
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mothers, Norton's de Manneville suggests that judges are impotent to
92
break in against the all-powerful rights of fathers.
Norton's agitation on behalf of the Custody of Infants bill did more
than change the future of child custody law. It also changed the way in
which the future would read the custody law of the past. Members of
Parliament debating Norton's proposal often disagreed about the advisability of passing it into law, complaining, for instance, that the law would
allow wives to leave their husbands with impunity,9 3 that women should
learn to obey their husbands, 94 and that a custody law would encourage
litigation9 5 and cause couples to bring their private disputes into the public arena.9 6 But they accepted Norton's view of legal history, not only
believing her version but also reading it into the record to be recorded
for all posterity: "[W] hat was the state of the law with respect to the subject to which this bill applied? By the law of England, as it now
stood, the
97
father had an absolute right to the custody of his children."
2. Early Scholarshipon Chancery'sJurisdiction.- In the decades before
Norton's crusade created the impression of absolute paternal rights, a
crisis arose in legal scholarship over the power of the Court of Chancery
to abrogate the rights of fathers to the custody of their children. The
Court of Chancery had for years been regulating testamentary guardians,
and had in 1756 quietly extended this regulation to include fathers themselves, 98 when a legal scholar caused a furor by labeling Chancery's jurisdiction over guardianship a "usurpation" of power.
The attack on the Court of Chancery's jurisdiction to interfere in
guardianship came in 1787 from Francis Hargrave, in his annotations to
one of the classic works of legal scholarship, Coke's Commentary upon Lit92. In addition to her rhetorical flourishes, Norton employs a selective and somewhat
sly use of citation. To support her reading of de Manneville as upholding absolute paternal
rights, Norton refrains from citing the court's language on its power to supersede a
father's custody rights: "[T]he Court has jurisdiction ... to control the right of the
father... to the person of the child." De Manneville v. de Manneville, 32 Eng. Rep. 762,
767 (Ch. 1804). Instead, she cites, without distinguishing it as such, the claim of the
father's lawyers that "the law is clear that the custody of the child, of whatever age, belongs to the
father," thereby leading her readers to assume that this was the holding of the case itself.
See Norton, Separation, supra note 67, at 36; de Manneville,32 Eng. Rep. at 764 (argument
of father's counsel).
93. See, e.g., 40 Parl. Deb. (3d ser.) 1115 (1838) ("The great tie which prevents the
separation of married persons is their common children. A wife was, in general, glad to
have that excuse for submitting to the temper of a capricious husband."); see also 43 Pal.
Deb. (3d ser.) 146 (1838) ("[T]he present state of the law favored reconciliation between
husband and wife. .. ").
94. See, e.g., 40 Parl. Deb. 1116; see also 43 Parl. Deb. 144 ("A woman's strength lay in
her submissiveness. .. ").
95. See 40 Parl. Deb. 1118 ("The Bill... opened a scene of misery for families, which
was interminable, and an extent of litigation which was perfectlyofrightfu .... .
96. See, e.g., 42 Parl. Deb. (3d ser.) 1050-54 (1838).
97. Id. at 486.
98. See infra Part III.
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tleton.99 In annotating Coke's note 88b, on guardianship, 10 0 Hargrave updated Coke's text by including the new jurisprudence by which the Court
of Chancery regulated guardians. 10 1 But when the moment came to explain the basis for this jurisdiction, Hargrave was stymied: "How this jurisdiction was acquired by [the Lord Chancellor] is not easy to state. The
1° 2
usual manner of accounting for it appears to us quite unsatisfactory."
Hargrave set forth the two major theories that had been advanced as the
basis for this jurisdiction, and rejected each in turn: first, the theory that
the Court of Chancery controlled guardianships because its power as
parens patriae to protect idiots and lunatics extended to infants as well,
and although the portion of the parenspatriaejurisdictionrelating to infants had been diverted to the Court of Wards in 1540, it reverted to
Chancery upon the abolition of that court in 1660;103 and second, that
guardianship was a trust, and as such subject to Chancery's
04

jurisdiction.'
Hargrave rejected the first theory by noting that whereas the Court
of Chancery had been specifically delegated the power to protect idiots
and lunatics as parenspatriae,no such delegation of authority existed with
99. See Hargrave, supra note 60. Coke's Commentary upon Littleton, also known as The
FirstPartof the Institutes of the Laws ofEngland, is itself a 1628 translation and annotation of
Thomas Littleton's 1481 Of Tenures. See Coke, supra note 60; Thomas Littleton, Of
Tenures (Edward Coke trans., London, W. Clarke 17th ed. 1817) (1481).
100. Note 88b of Coke's Commentary upon Littleton annotates Chapter 5, Section 123 of
Littleton's Of Tenures, on guardianship in socage, a type of guardianship based on the
medieval system of land tenures, discussed infra at notes 123-126 and accompanying text.
At the end of note 88b, Coke provides a general overview of the types of guardianship then
extant under English law. See Coke, supra note 60, at 88b.
Since the analysis of guardianship provided by Littleton and Coke was based on the
medieval system of land tenures, it became largely outdated when that system was
abolished by the Tenures Abolition Act in 1660. See discussion infra at Parts IIA and II.B.
101. See Hargrave, supra note 60, at 88b. Hargrave casts his discussion in terms of the
Court of Chancery's power to appoint guardians rather than its power to regulate existing
guardians. See id. at 88b n.16 (discussing "guardian by appointment of the lord
chancellor"). In the years following the establishment of testamentary guardianships, the
Court of Chancery would occasionally appoint guardians where none had been devised by
testament. These cases usually came before the Court of Chancery in connection with the
administration of an inheritance to an infant heir. See, e.g., Doctor Davis's Case, 24 Eng.
Rep. 577 (Ch. 1721) (committing the custody of an infant heiress to a guardian). The
Court of Chancery could also appoint a guardian upon request. See Ex parte Watkins, 28
Eng. Rep. 301 (Ch. 1752). But the power to appoint new guardians was primarily an aspect
of the power to supervise, and if necessary replace, existing guardians. And indeed, two of
the four cases that Hargrave cites involve the regulation of an existing testamentary
guardianship, rather than the appointment of a guardian where none existed. See
Hargrave, supra note 60, at 88b n.16 (citing Shaftsbury v. Shaftsbury, 25 Eng. Rep. 121
(Ch. 1725) and Teynham v. Lennard, 2 Eng. Rep. 204 (H.L. 1724), both of which involved
testamentary guardians).
102. Hargrave, supra note 60, at 88b.
103. See id. (citing Shaftsbury v. Shaftsbury, 25 Eng. Rep. 121 (Ca. 1725)). As
discussed supra at note 36, this theory was first advanced in Falkland v. Bertie, 23 Eng. Rep.
814, 818 (Ch. 1696).
104. See Hargrave, supra note 60, at 88b n.16.
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respect to infants; that the Court of Chancery's exercise of a parens patriae
jurisdiction over infants prior to the establishment of a Court of Wards
"remains to be proved; or at least we, after a diligent search, do not find
any authority in print"; 10 5 and that the Court of Chancery had itself explicitly rejected the notion that its power over guardianship was at all
related to its power over idiots and lunatics. 10 6 He then dismissed the
trust theory as "an overstrained refinement," on the basis that "in the
technical sense in which our lawyers use the word... trusts are invariably
applied to property, especially real estates, and not to the person."10 7 Hargrave ultimately concluded that the jurisdiction of Chancery was based
upon a "usurpation" of power of recent origin, but a necessary one, and
08
one which had become, through precedent, unquestionable.1
The result of Hargrave's questioning of the basis of Chancery's jurisdiction to interfere in guardianships was that the Court of Chancery itself
began to doubt the basis of its ownjurisdiction. Hargrave was an attorney
in Powel v. Cleaver'0 9 in 1789, and attempted to raise the issue of Chancery's jurisdiction to control guardianship and, more specifically, fathers."10 The court responded by refusing to hear any arguments on the
subject of its jurisdiction to regulate guardianships. 11 Similarly, in Creuze
v. Hunter1 12 in 1790, where the Court of Chancery again interfered with a
father's custody rights, the Lord Chancellor responded to the questioning of its jurisdiction by the father's counsel by declaring that "if the
House of Lords thought differently, they might control his judgment; but
he certainly would not allow the child to be sacrificed to the views of the
3
father.""l
The Court of Chancery's doubt about its jurisdiction over guardianships was allayed in 1793, when John Fonblanque published a rebuttal of
105. Id.
106. See id. (citing Ex parte Whitfield, 26 Eng. Rep. 592, 592 (Ch. 1742)
(distinguishing Chancery's jurisdiction over guardianship from its jurisdiction over "ideots
and lunatics")).
107. Id.
108. Id. Hargrave explained:
However, we must not be understood by these remarks to controvert the present
legality of the jurisdiction thus exercised in Chancery over infants; our intent
being simply to shew, that such jurisdiction is not, asfar as yet appears,of ancient
date; and that, though it is now unquestionable, yet at first it seems to have been
an usurpation, for which the best excuse was, that the case was not otherwise
sufficiently provided for.
Id.
109. 29 Eng. Rep. 274 (Ch. 1789). For a discussion of Powel, see infra Part III.C.1.
110. See id. at 276.
111. Toward the end of his career as Lord Chancellor, Lord Eldon described the
behind-the-scenes arguments of Powel, where he had assisted as counsel. According to
Eldon, Lord Thurlow "would not allow us to argue the question of jurisdiction; and
perhaps he was right." Wellesley v. Beaufort, 38 Eng. Rep. 236, 244 (Ch. 1827).
112. 30 Eng. Rep. 113 (Ch. 1790).
113. Id. at 113.
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Hargrave's attack on the jurisdiction. 1 4 Fonblanque agreed with Hargrave in rejecting the trusteeship theory of jurisdiction, although for a
slightly different reason, namely, that the Court of Exchequer could oversee trusts but not guardianship."i 5 But Fonblanque instead came up with
a new version of the argument Hargrave had rejected regarding Chancery's power of parenspatriae. Fonblanque's explanation for the lack of
any specific delegation of the power of parens patriaerelating to infants
was that this power had always existed, for the simple reason that it was a
116
necessary element of a civilized state.
In the cases that followed, the Court of Chancery repeatedly cited
Fonblanque's parens patriaejustification for its power over fathers and
guardians. However, it often, in the very same breath, expressed doubts
about whether parenspatriaewas indeed the source of this power 117 The
important thing, according to the Court of Chancery, was not the origins
of its jurisdiction, but the necessity that it exist," 8 and the fact that the
Court of Chancery had for over a century exercised it. 1 9 As this Note will
now show, it had started to do so in the cases of testamentary guardianship. And the manner in which it had done so, in contrast to the views of
Hargrave and Fonblanque, was by treating guardianship as a trust.
II. THE SOURCE OF JUDICIAL POWER: THE REGULATION OF
TESTAmENTARY GuARDIANs

Judicial discretion over child custody neither developed in 1839 nor
always existed in the form ofparenspatriae.This Part describes the history
of the law of testamentary guardians, which served as the original basis for
judicial discretion in child custody. Although judicial power was originally limited to cases in which a guardian was appointed for an infant,
Part III will explain how this power expanded to allow second-guessing of
fathers themselves. The birth of testamentary guardians law came in
1660, but an understanding of the change that year wrought requires an
114. See Fonblanque, supra note 60.
115. See id. at 231.
116. See id. at 228-29. Fonblanque reasoned:
That in every civilized state, such a superintendence and protective power does
somewhere exist, will scarcely be controverted.

That if not found to exist

elsewhere, it may be presumed to vest in the crown, will not, I think, be denied.
Assuming, therefore, that the general superintendence of infants did originally
vest in the crown, I shall conclude, that ei ratione, it is now exercised in the
Court of Chancery as a branch of its general jurisdiction.
Id. at 229.
117. See de Manneville v. de Manneville, 32 Eng. Rep. 762, 767 (Ch. 1804); see also
Wellesley v. Beaufort, 38 Eng. Rep. 236, 243 (Ch. 1827) (discussing the notion of parens
patriae as one theory among many about the basis of its jurisdiction over guardianship).
118. See Wellesley, 38 Eng. Rep. at 243 ("[N]otwithstanding all the doubts that may
exist as to the origin of thisjurisdiction, it will be found to be absolutely necessary that such
ajurisdiction should exist.").
119. See id. ("[T]hat this jurisdiction belongs to the Court [of Chancery] and to the
individual who sits in it ... I take... to have been long settled by judicial practice.").
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acquaintance with the complex regime that existed before. This Part
thus begins by describing that regime, and then introduces the watershed
statute and the case law that, in interpreting the statute, gave remarkable
powers to the Court of Chancery.
A. Child Custody Law Before 1660
Prior to the Tenures Abolition Act, English child custody law was for
the most part a by-product of the laws of inheritance and land ownership.
The laws regarding the custody of children who did not stand to inherit a
landed estate were minimal and rarely invoked. Guardianship of such
children, known as guardianship by nurture, fell to both the father20and
It
mother, and lasted until the children reached the age of fourteen.'
was regarding those children who did stand to inherit estates that the law
of child custody was complex and well-developed. This Section will describe the three types of guardianship by which the custody of infant heirs
could be controlled: the guardianship by nature, the guardianship in
chivalry, and the guardianship in socage.
A father had the supreme right to the guardianship of his infant
heirs. The father's guardianship was known as the guardianship by nature, and lasted until the heir reached the age of twenty-one.' 2 ' When
the father of an infant heir died, the guardianship 12 2 of that heir was
123
determined by the medieval system of land division known as tenures.
Under the tenures system, the landed classes did not own their estates,
but in fact held them as tenants of the Crown and of the few select lords
120. Littleton, writing in 1481, does not discuss the issue of guardianship in regard to
children who were not to inherit an estate. Coke, in 1628, mentions the existence of a
guardianship "percause de nurture," but does not explain what this guardianship consists of,
or to whom it belongs. See Coke, supra note 60, at 88b. But later writers explain that the
guardianship by nurture to which Coke refers belonged to both the father and the mother,
and lasted until the infant reached the age of fourteen. See Hargrave, supra note 60, at
88b n.13; see also Bingham, supra note 60, at 159; John David Chambers, A Practical
Treatise on the Jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery over the Persons and Property
of Infants 63 (1842); Macpherson, supra note 70, at 59-67.
121. See Littleton, supra note 99, at § 114 ("[N]one shall be in ward of his bodie to
any lord living his father.... ."); see also Coke, supra note 60, at 88b; Hargrave, supra note
60, at 88b n.12.
122. The guardianship of an infant by one who was not his parent was also referred to
as a "wardship"; the infant was the guardian's "ward." See, e.g., 1 Blackstone, supra note 1,
at *459.
123. For general overviews of the medieval system of land tenures, see 2 Blackstone,
supra note 1, at *58-*79; Coke, supra note 60; Littleton, supra note 99. For a modem
history of the system of tenures and its decline, see Charles J. Reid, Jr., The SeventeenthCentury Revolution in the English Land Law, 43 Clev. St. L. Rev. 221 (1995) (arguing that
the abolition of feudal land law came about as the result of the English Revolution in the
seventeenth century, rather than as the result of incremental change). According to Reid,
the notion of trusts, and the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery to oversee trusts,
developed as an attempt to thwart the feudal system of land ownership, and began to
acquire widespread legal significance when the Tenures Abolition Act abolished the feudal
system of land law.
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to whom the Crown had originally conveyed its land.1 24 Of the several

types of medieval land tenure, the two most common, the tenure in chivalry (also known as the tenure by knight-service) 125 and the tenure in
socage, 126 had as their corollaries two types of guardianships of infants,
28
the guardianship in chivalry127 and the guardianship in socage.'
129
The most prestigious estates were held as tenures in chivalry.
When a tenant in chivalry died leaving an heir under the age of maturity,
the guardianship of that heir fell to the lord of the estate, 3 0 regardless of
whether the heir's mother was still alive. 13 ' The guardian in chivalry
could control both the lands and the person of the ward' 3 2 until the in133
fant reached the age of twenty-one, if male, and sixteen, if female.
3
4
This control included the right to arrange the ward's marriage,
which,
since the ward stood to inherit a considerable estate, was of significant
value. The guardian in chivalry could marry the ward to his own offspring, 3 5 arrange a marriage in exchange for money,' 3 6 or sell the wardship itself, which was considered a form of chattel.' 37
124. See 2 Blackstone, supra note 1, at *59-*60.
125. See id. at *62 ("The first, most universal, and esteemed the most honourable
species of tenure, was that by knight-service, called in Latin servitium militare, and in law
French, chivalry, or service de chivaler.").
126. See id. at *79. After the abolition of the tenure in chivalry by the Tenures
Abolition Act, all land held in chivalry reverted to tenures in socage. Tenures Abolition
Act, 12 Car. 2, ch. 24, § 1.
127. See 2 Blackstone, supra note 1, at *67.
128. See id. at *87.
129. See id. at *62. For a general overview of the guardianship in chivalry, see
Macpherson, supra note 70, at 2-18.
130. See Littleton, supra note 99, § 103.
131. See Coke, supra note 60, at 84b ("[T]he mother shall not barre the lord by
knight's service of his wardship of the bodie.").
132. See id. at 76a ("[T]he lord [in chivalry] hath the wardship of the body and the
land."); see also 2 Blackstone, supra note 1, at *67; Custer, supra note 27, at 199.
133. See Littleton, supra note 99, § 103.
134. See 2 Blackstone, supra note 1, at *70-*71; Littleton, supra note 99, § 110. By
the Statute of Merton, 20 Hen. 3, ch. 6 (1236), the ward was granted the right to refuse a
marriage considered one of "disparagement," i.e., to a person considered of lower dignity
or rank, such as a lunatic or idiot, a person with certain physical impediments, a widow, or
the son or daughter of a convicted felon or a tradesman. See Coke, supra note 60, at
80a-80b; Littleton, supra note 99, § 107.
135. For a discussion of guardians who married their wards to their own children, see
Joel Hurstfield, The Queen's Wards 142-44 (1973).
136. See 2 Blackstone, supra note 1, at *71; Littleton, supra note 99, § 110. Even
when a marriage was not one of disparagement, a ward could refuse the marriage arranged
by the guardian in chivalry, but was then responsible to the guardian for the value of such
marriage. See id. § 110.
137. See Coke, supra note 60, at 85a; Hargrave, supra note 60, at 88b n.11
("[G]uardianship in chivalry, being deemed more an interestfor the profit of the guardian
than a trust for the benefit of the ward, was saleable and transferable, like the ordinary
subjects of property, to the best bidder."); Littieton, supra note 99, § 116. Hurstfield
relates that the guardianship of a ward "would be sold, sometimes to his mother, more
often to a complete stranger." Hurstfield, supra note 135, at 18.
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Before 1660, the most important reform to the guardianship in chivalry occurred in 1540, when Henry VIII passed a statute establishing the
Court of Wards and Liveries.' 3 8 In the years leading up to 1540, Henry
VIII had uncovered several long-forgotten tenures in chivalry possessed
by the Crown. Accompanying-and motivating the discovery of-these
newfound tenures in chivalry was a number of guardianships in chivalry
that now devolved to the Crown. The Court of Wards was created to administer these royal guardianships. 139
The tenure in socage involved lower-ranking estates than the tenure
in chivalry, 140 and entailed a less powerful form of guardianship. 141
When a tenant in socage died and left an heir under the age of fourteen,
the guardianship of that heir devolved to the nearest of kin who could
not inherit the estate. This guardian was the guardian in socage. Guardians in socage could control the person of the ward and manage the
ward's estates until the infant reached the age of fourteen. 14 2 But the
guardian in socage could act only for the infant's benefit, and was liable,
when the infant came of age, for any financial losses incurred through
the management of the guardian, including loss of income through a
disadvantageous marriage. 143 The guardianship in socage was not a form
of property but instead a trust held for the infant's benefit, and as such
was not transferable.'4

138. See 32 Hen. 8, ch. 46 (1540).
139. The Court of Wards controlled these guardianships for the benefit of the Crown,
selling marriages and guardianships in order to increase the Crown's revenues. The
Crown's management of its wards was heavily resented by the landed classes, and was one
of the perceived abuses of power that led to the overthrow of the monarchy in 1642. For a
history of the establishment of the Court of Wards and its role in the overthrow, see
Hurstfield, supra note 135, at 7-17, 329-30; Reid, supra note 123, at 236-42.
140. See 2 Blackstone, supra note 1, at *78-*79.
141. For general overviews of the guardianship in socage, see Bingham, supra note 60,
at 156; Chambers, supra note 120, at 59-63; Macpherson, supra note 70, at 19-43.
142. See 2 Blackstone, supra note 1, at *88; Littleton, supra note 99, § 123; see also
Bingham, supra note 60, at 156.
143. See Littleton, supra note 99, § 123.
144. See Hargrave, supra note 60, at 88b n.13 ("Being wholly for the infant's benefit,
and not in any respect for the guardian's profit, [the guardianship in socage] is not a
subject either of alienation forfeiture or succession, as wardship in chivalry was."); see also
Bedell v. Constable, 124 Eng. Rep. 1026 (C.P. 1668) (holding that a testamentary
guardianship, like the guardianship in socage, is a trust, and as such not transferable); id.
at 1028 ("A guardian in soccage [sic] cannot transfer his custody, because it is a personal
trust.").
It is important to note that although the word "trust" appears in Hargrave's 1787
annotations to Coke's Commentay upon Littleton in reference to the distinction between the
guardianships in chivalry and in socage, supra note 60, neither Coke nor Littleton referred
to guardianship in socage as a "trust" This can be explained by Charles Reid's theory that
the notion of trusts did not come into widespread use until the abolition of feudal tenures
by the 1660 Tenures Abolition Act. See Reid, supra note 123, at 280-90.
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B. The Tenures Abolition Act
146
The Tenures Abolition Act 1 45 abolished the tenures in chivalry
and all that accompanied them, 147 including the guardianships in chivalry148 and the Court of Wards that had managed that portion of those
guardianships that had devolved to the Crown. 149 To fill the gap left by
the abolition of guardianships in chivalry, the Act gave fathers the right to
appoint guardians to their infant heirs, either to take over custody during
the father's lifetime or to succeed him in custody after his death. 150 The
father was free to appoint these guardianships to any person he chose as
long as he or she held property' 5 1 and was not Catholic. 152 The resulting guardianship was meant to be equivalent to that held by the father
himself.153 It lasted until the infant reached the age of twenty-

145. Tenures Abolition Act, 12 Car. 2, ch. 24 (1660).
146. See id. § 1. All tenures became tenures in socage.
147. The Tenures Abolition Act pertained not only to guardianship, but to the entire
system of land law of which guardianship was a part. It is often discussed in the context of
land law and, more generally, as signaling the end of feudalism. Blackstone considered the
Act a revolutionary watershed in the laws of England: "A statute, which was a greater
acquisition to the civil property of this kingdom than even magnacartaitself; since that only
pruned the luxuriances that had grown out of the military tenures, and thereby preserved
them in vigor;, but the statute of King Charles extirpated the whole, and demolished both
root and branches." 2 Blackstone, supra note 1, at *77. Reid, supra note 123, makes a
similar argument.
148. See Tenures Abolition Act § 1.
149. See id. § 3 (repealing 32 Hen. 8, ch. 46 (1540)).
150. The statute stated:
[W]here any person hath or shall have any child or children under the age of
twenty one years and not married at the time of his death.., it shall and may be
lawful to and for the father of such child or children, whether born at the time of
the decease of the father or at that time in ventre sa mere, or whether such father
be within the age of twenty one years or of fill age by his deed executed in his life
time, or by his last will and testament in writing in the presence of two or more
credible witnesses in such manner and from time to time as he shall respectively
think fit to dispose of the custody and tuition of such child or children for and
during such time as he or they shall respectively remain under the age of twenty
one years or any lesser time.... [S] uch disposition of the custody, of such child or
children.., shall be good and effectual against all and every person or persons
claiming the custody or tuition of such child or children as guardian in socage or
otherwise ....
Id. § 8.
151. See id. (requiring that the guardianship be granted to "persons... in possession
or remainder").
152. See id. (prohibiting the father from appointing the guardianship to any "popish
recusants," i.e., Catholics).
153. From the start, judges interpreting the Tenures Abolition Act read the Act as
intending to put testamentary guardians in the same position as fathers themselves. See
Shaftsbury v. Shaftsbury, 25 Eng. Rep. 121, 124 (Ch. 1725) ("The Testamentary Guardian is
in Loco Parentis... ."); see also the version of Shafisbuy reported at 24 Eng. Rep. 659, 666
("[A]s the father was the head of the family, so the statute puts [the testamentary
guardian] in loco patris."). However, prior to the Tenures Abolition Act, the extent of the
father's own rights, being a matter of common law rather than statute, had never been
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one, 5 4 and it superseded all other guardianships, including the guardi155
anship by nurture of the child's own mother.
The result was a revolution in the law of guardianship. Although
theoretically, the old guardianships in socage still existed, these fell into
disuse, in part because their underlying premise-that a guardian who
stood to inherit an infant's lands would harm his or her own kin-came
to be seen as a barbaric remnant of ancient times. 156 Thereafter, when a
custody dispute arose concerning an infant whose father had died without appointing a guardian, 157 or whose testamentary guardian had become incapacitated, 158 the Court of Chancery would itself appoint a
guardian whose legal status was akin to that of a testamentary guardian. 159 The difference between the new father- or court-appointed
guardianship and the guardianships in chivalry and in socage was vast.
Guardianship was no longer an automatic function of the laws of inheritance, but was instead a matter of choice. Although at first this choice fell
quite so clearly delineated. Littleton, writing in 1481, and Coke, writing in 1628, had
determined that the father, as guardian by nature, had the right of custody of his infant
heirs under the age of twenty-one. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. Coke had
also mentioned a species of guardianship called guardianship by nurture, but had not
specified what this guardianship consisted of. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
Thus, the Tenures Abolition Act, by giving testamentary guardians rights equivalent to
those of fathers and specifying what those rights were, had the further effect of delineating
the previously undefined boundaries of fathers' own rights.
154. See Tenures Abolition Act § 8 (allowing father to "dispose of the custody and
tuition of [his] child or children for and during such time as he or they shall respectively
remain under the age of twenty one years or any lesser time").
155. See id. ("[Sluch disposition of the custody of such child or children ... shall be
good and effectual against all and every person or persons claiming the custody or tuition
of such child or children as guardian in socage or otherwise...."). Courts interpreted this
language to mean that testamentary guardians superseded all others, even the infant's
mother. See, e.g., the version of Shafisbury v. Shaftsbury reported at 24 Eng. Rep. 659, 663
(Ch. 1725) ("The right of a testamentary guardian takes place of [a mother, because) by
the express words of the act of parliament the guardian by will takes place of all other

guardians....").
156. See Mr. Justice Dormer's Case, 24 Eng. Rep. 723, 724 (Ch. 1724) (rejecting, in
the absence of a testamentary guardian, "the maxim, that the next of kin to whom the land
cannot descend is to be guardian in socage," as "not grounded upon reason, but [having]
prevailed in barbarous times before the nation was civilized").
157. See, e.g., Ex parte Watkins, 28 Eng. Rep. 301 (Ch. 1752) (appointing guardian
where there is "no testamentary guardian so as to be valid" and "neither father nor
mother").
158. See, e.g., Morgan v. Dillon, 88 Eng. Rep. 361 (Ch. 1724) (appointing a guardian
to replace the testamentary guardian, the infants' mother, on the ground that she became
incapacitated to hold the testamentary guardianship upon remarriage), rev'd sub nom.
Dillon v. Mount-Cashell, 2 Eng. Rep. 207 (H.L. 1727) (reinstating the mother as
testamentary guardian on the ground that remarriage did not incapacitate her).
159. The court-appointed guardian was a proxy for the testamentary guardian, who in
turn was a proxy for the father himself, "who is the root out of which all guardians spring."
Morgan, 88 Eng. Rep. at 365. See also Mr. Justice Dormer's Case, 24 Eng. Rep. at 724
("[W] here a man dies intestate, the law should dispose of the guardianship of his children
in the same manner as the intestate would be supposed to do, had he lived to make will.").
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only to fathers, the idea of discretion in guardian selection eventually
would become the touchstone of child custody decisionmaking.
C. The Regulation of Testamentary Guardianshipsby the Court of Chancery
The regulation of the testamentary guardians appointed under the
1660 statute 60 fell to the Court of Chancery, which until 1873 administered the law of equity. 161 The substantive basis for Chancery's authority
over testamentary guardianships was that guardianship was a trust, and as
such subject to the Court of Chancery's power to oversee all trusts. 16 2 To
carry out the trusteeship, the guardian was entitled to the custody and
control of the person and property of the ward,163 and could petition the
Court of Chancery to enforce these rights against the wardl6 or against
160. This Section will discuss both cases involving testamentary guardians and cases
involving guardians appointed by the Court of Chancery in the absence of a testamentary
appointment. Throughout this Section, the generic term "guardian" will be used to refer
to both father- and court-appointed guardians, and the infants under the care of such
guardians will be referred to interchangeably as "wards" or "wards of court."
161. The Judicature Act of 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., ch. 66, merged the law of equity with
the common law. Before 1873, the English judicial system was divided into two separate
branches, common law and equity. The law of equity originally emerged as an alternative
to the more rigid common law. In cases where the common law did not provide a redress
of grievances, a petition could be made to the law of equity. The law of equity was
administered by the Court of Chancery. In response to a petition, in earlier times made
directly to the Crown or to Parliament, and later made to the Court of Chancery, the Lord
Chancellor of the Court of Chancery could use the royal power to make orders based on
his sense of fairness where he felt that justice did not prevail under the common law.
Judicial interference in issues of child custody occurred primarily through the Court
of Chancery, and it was the Court of Chancery that first asserted a power to interfere
between father and child. Chancery was less accessible to the public than the common law
courts, as it was more centralized and met less frequently than did the courts of common
law, and Chancery cases were generally more expensive to litigate than were cases at
common law. Therefore a large segment of the population was not, at first, affected by the
legal developments discussed in this Note. It was only when the courts of common law and
equity were merged by the Judicature Act of 1873 that the developments of the Court of
Chancery in child custody law became applicable to the public at large. TheJudicature Act
specifically legislated that "[in questions relating to the custody and education of infants
the Rules of Equity shall prevail." Judicature Act § 25(10). For a discussion of the
distinctions between the common law courts and the Court of Chancery, and of the impact
this had on the practice of child custody law, see A. H. Manchester, A Modern Legal
History of England and Wales 1750-1950, at 148, 360-401 (1980).
162. See Beaufort v. Berty, 24 Eng. Rep. 579, 580 (Ch. 1721) (holding that the
jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery to regulate testamentary guardianship "was grounded
upon the general power andjurisdiction which it had over all trusts, and guardianship was
most plainly a trust"); see also Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 24 Eng. Rep. 659, 660 (Ch. 1722)
(finding that guardianship "being a matter of trust, this court has superintendency over
it").
163. See Eyre, 24 Eng. Rep. at 661 (upholding a testamentary guardian's right to
control the daily activities of his ward on the basis that he "will well execute such trust,
which it will be impossible for him to do, without being allowed to place and choose the
governor, gentleman, &c., to attend upon and take care of this young nobleman").
164. See Tremain's Case, 93 Eng. Rep. 452 (Ch. 1719) (sending a messenger to escort
a ward to the school his guardian had chosen for him, and upon ward's subsequent
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third parties, 165 including the ward's mother.166 In turn, the ward or
third parties could petition the Court of Chancery to enforce the testamentary guardian's duties toward his ward.' 67 Just as the court could employ its equitable powers to control a trustee who had breached his fiduciary duties by mismanaging an estate, so too could it use those powers to
68
control a guardian who had mismanaged an infant.'
The management of an estate can be evaluated in terms of financial
value, but evaluating the management of a child is a much less definite
enterprise. As a result, the court had a wide discretion in determining
what the duties of a testamentary guardian were, and how they should be
fulfilled. Furthermore, because the care of an infant was a much more
sacred trust than the care of land,' 69 the court had broad discretion in
determining how it should carry out its supervisory role over guardianships. The court decided early on, in the case of Beaufort v. Berty, 170 that
it could best oversee guardians by acting, not only to punish a breach of
guardian's duty once it had occurred, but also to prevent such a breach
of duty from occurring in the first place, because "[a] preventingjusticewas
to be preferred to [a] punishingjustice."171 The following subsections will
departure from the school, sending a second messenger both to carry the ward back to
school and to keep him there).
165. See Foster v. Denny, 22 Eng. Rep. 925 (Ch. 1677) (ordering an uncle to deliver
an infant of seven years to the child's mother, whom the father had appointed guardian).
166. See Eyre, 24 Eng. Rep. at 659 (ordering a mother to surrender her child to the
testamentary guardian).
167. See Beaufort, 24 Eng. Rep. at 579 (agreeing to investigate the propriety of the
educational arrangements made for an infant by his testamentary guardians, upon a
petition by the infant's mother); see also Vernon's Case (Ch. 1723), unreported case cited
in Shaftsbury v. Shaftsbury, 25 Eng. Rep. 121, 122 (Ch. 1725) (ordering infant removed
from guardian's home and sent to school, upon petition by third party on infant's behalf
claiming that infant was improperly conversant with guardian's daughter).
168. The Beaufort court stated:
[S]uppose one should devise lands to trustees to sell for such a price as they
should think fit, for payment of debts, there could be no doubt but that this
court, at the desire of any single creditor, might and would interpose, and order
the estate not to be sold as the trustees should see fit, but for the best price before
the master; and as the Court would interpose, where the estate of a man was
devised in trust, so would it a fortiori concern itself, on the custody of a child's
being devised to a guardian, who was but a person intrusted in that case.
24 Eng. Rep. at 579.
169. See Bedell v. Constable, 124 Eng. Rep. 1026, 1028 (C.P. 1668) ("[A] more near
or tenderer trust cannot be, than the custody and education of a mans [sic] child and
heir."); see also Beaufort, 24 Eng. Rep. at 579 ("[Nlothing could be of greater concern than
the education of infants.").
170. 24 Eng. Rep. 579 (Ch. 1721).
171. Beaufort, 24 Eng. Rep. at 579. The court continued:
[HJisLordship observed... that he ought rather to prevent the mischief and
misbehaviour of guardians, than to punish it when done. That if any wrong steps
had been taken which might not deserve punishment, yet if they were such as
induced the least suspicion of the infant's being like to suffer by the conduct of
the guardians.. . , or if the guardians chose to make use of methods that might
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delineate the full extent of Chancery's activism, an activism that made
regulation of fathers just another small step for the court. The first subsection explores the areas of a child's life into which Chancery felt free to
venture, and the two subsections following explain the factors that
weighed in Chancery's decisionmaking and the tools the court used to
effect its decisions.
1. The Areas of Chancery'sInvolvement. - a. Marriage. - The Court
of Chancery considered the control over an infant's marriage an especially important aspect of testamentary guardianship.172 The testamentary guardian's control over the marriage of his or her ward derived from
the Tenures Abolition Act's granting the guardian the right to bring an
action called a "ravishment of ward" against anyone who married the
ward without permission, 173 and was further strengthened by Hardwicke's Marriage Act of 1753,174 under which a marriage obtained without the consent of an infant's parent or guardian was held to be void.
A guardian who feared that a ward was in danger of contracting a
marriage without consent could apply to the court to help prevent the
marriage. The court would then issue an injunction, lasting until the infant reached the age of twenty-one, ordering the offending party to refrain from contracting a marriage with the ward' 75 and even, in some
17 6
In
cases, to refrain from any further communications with the ward.
the absence of a specific injunction on the subject of marriage, a person
who married an infant ward without the guardian's consent, or helped to
arrange such a marriage, was subject, not only to the action of ravishment
of ward brought by the guardian, but also, at the court's discretion, to a
writ of contempt of court. The contempt of court could be enforced by
turn to the prejudice of the infant, the court would interpose and order the
contrary.
Id. at 579-80.
172. In an early case, the court noted that "a court of equity entertains no greater
jealousy of, nor shews more resentment against any thing, than... the matter of marrying
infants without the proper consent of guardians." Shaftsbury v. Shaftsbury (Ch. 1725), as
reported at Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 24 Eng. Rep. 659, 662 (Ch. 1722).
173. The Tenures Abolition Act does not mention marriage per se, but grants the
guardian a more general power to "maintaine an action of ravishment of ward or trespasse
against any person or persons which shall wrongfully take away or detaine" the ward.
Tenures Abolition Act, 12 Car. 2, ch. 24, § 8. But in practice, the action for "ravishment of
ward" was used frequently in cases where a person had married the ward without the

guardian's permission. The "ravishment of ward" originated in feudal times as a remedy
available to guardians whose wards had been married without their consent. See
Hurstfield, supra note 135, at 143; Theodore Plucknett, A Concise History of Common
Law 535 (5th ed. 1956).
174. 26 Geo. 2, ch. 33. For a discussion of the passage and early application of
Hardwicke's Marriage Act, see Stone, supra note 54, at 121-37.
175. See Smith v. Smith, 26 Eng. Rep. 977 (Ch. 1745) (forbidding a young man from
marrying a ward without the permission of the court).
176. See Beard v. Travers, 28 Eng. Rep. 485 (Ch. 1749) (forbidding a young man and
his parents from marrying, having access to, or writing letters to a ward, and forbidding the
ward likewise from writing letters to the man and his parents).
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imprisonment or sequestration of property.17 7 Eventually, the court extended the punishment of contempt of court for marrying or arranging
the marriage of a ward without the guardian's permission even to those
who did not know that the infant was the ward of a testamentary
178
guardian.
In addition to enforcing the guardian's right to control a ward's marriage, the Court of Chancery superintended the guardian's exercise of
this right. The court exercised this supervision in both a preventive and a
punitive manner. 179 In cases where an infant had not yet married, but a
petition on the subject of the infant's guardianship had been brought
before the court, the court might order a guardian to refrain from marrying the infant without the court's consent,' 8 0 and would subject the
guardian to contempt of court for disobeying this injunction. 181 The
court often supplemented this injunction by requiring a security deposit
82
from the guardian to ensure compliance.'
Once such an injunction had been issued, the court had control over
all aspects of an infant's marriage. A guardian who desired to arrange
marriage for a ward was required to contact an officer of the court known
as the Master, who would help the guardian to negotiate the marriage
contract. If the Master approved of the arrangement, he would submit a
report to the Lord Chancellor, who had the power to approve or refuse
177. Thus, in Shaftsbuty v. Shaftsbury, the Court of Chancery issued a writ of contempt
of court against an infant's mother who had arranged her son's marriage without his
guardian's consent. See Shaftsbury v. Shaftsbury, 25 Eng. Rep. 121, 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (Ch.
1725) (ordering a sequestration of the mother's property). The courtjustified its action by
emphasizing that "the marriage of a ward without consent of the guardian, is a ravishment
of ward, and aggravated in this respect, that after such ravishment by marriage, the ward
cannot be restored to such condition as he was in before." Shaftsbuy, 24 Eng. Rep. at 661.
Thus, punishment was necessary to deter others from similarly acting against a guardian's
wishes. See id. at 663 ("In all these cases the reason of inflicting punishment is for
example's sake, and to deter others from the like offence of ravishment of wards.").
178. See Mr. Herbert's Case, 24 Eng. Rep. 992, 993 (Ch. 1731) (holding that marrying
a guardian's ward is a contempt of court, though the parties concerned had no notice that
she was a ward, because "where the marriage of an infant is encouraged without the
concurrence of his real guardians or relations, the consequences of such marriage ought
to be at the peril of all those that are instrumental therein").
179. See Shaftsbumy, 24 Eng. Rep. at 662 ("[A]s this Court punishes the instruments
where such marriage is had without the consent of the guardian, so if there be only an
apprehension, that the infant will be married unequally, either by the guardian, or by his
neglect, a court of equity will interpose.").
180. See Foster v. Denny, 22 Eng. Rep. 925 (Ch. 1677) (ordering testamentary
guardian not to marry ward without consent of court).
181. See Doctor Davis's Case, 24 Eng. Rep. 577 (Ch. 1721) (amending order
prohibiting a guardian from allowing his ward to marry without the court's consent so that
the guardian would not be subject to contempt of court should the ward marry without his
knowledge or consent); see also Long v. Elways, 25 Eng. Rep. 378 (Ch. 1729) (holding that
where a guardian was ordered not to marry his ward without the court's consent, upon the
marriage of the ward without any such consent, the guardian can avoid contempt of court
only by showing that he was not privy to the marriage).
182. See Foster, 22 Eng. Rep. at 925.
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the petition.' 8 3 Where a guardian had not been under a specific injuncdon to consult the court before marrying his ward, the court would nevertheless respond to a marriage of a ward with an order of contempt where
it felt that the guardian's actions constituted a breach of duty. 1 8 4
b. Education. - The Tenures Abolition Act gave the testamentary
guardian the right to control the "tuition" of the ward. 18 5 Several cases
involving disputes over the choice of school for a ward illustrate the extensive nature of the court's interaction with the testamentary guardianship. A guardian might petition the Court of Chancery to enforce his or
her right to control a ward's schooling by ordering the ward to obey the
guardian's orders to attend a particular school, 8 6 or a ward or a third
187
party might petition the court to dispute a guardian's choice of school.
In both instances, the court would order its Master to look into the school
chosen by the guardians, and to evaluate whether it was appropriate for
the infant. The father's expressly stated wishes regarding the child's education would also be consulted.' 8 8 The court would then order the infant
and the guardian into court to discuss the situation, taking on the paternalistic role of questioning the guardian's choice of school in some
cases, 189 and scolding an infant for unreasonableness in others. 90 Fi183. See Gordon v. Irwin, 2 Eng. Rep. 241 (Ch. 1781) (reaffirming decision by Court
of Chancery rejecting a petition by guardians for permission to marry their ward, where
the guardians had arranged the marriage with the help of the Master of the Court of
Chancery, and the Master had submitted to the Lord Chancellor a report approving the
marriage). For an example of the extent to which the Lord Chancellor could become
involved in the minute details of a ward's marriage settlement, and in doing so act upon
his own opinion of what was in the ward's best interests, see Bathurst v. Murray, 32 Eng.
Rep. 279, 280 (Ch. 1801) (insisting that the marriage settlement of a female ward give a
portion of her income to her husband, on the ground that "there cannot be much
expectation of happiness, where the husband has nothing, and the wife has the whole
controul over the property").
184. See Goodall v. Harris, 24 Eng. Rep. 862 (Ch. 1729) (ordering imprisonment of
guardian who breached his duty to his ward by marrying her to his own son, even though
the guardian had not been specifically ordered to consult the court before arranging the
ward's marriage).
185. Tenures Abolition Act, 12 Car. 2, ch. 24, § 8.
186. See Tremain's Case, 93 Eng. Rep. 452 (Ch. 1719); see also Hall v. Hall, 26 Eng.
Rep. 1213 (Ch. 1749) (citing Tremain's Case).
187. See Beaufort v. Berty, 24 Eng. Rep. 579 (Ch. 1721).
188. See Anonymous, 28 Eng. Rep. 38 (Ch. 1750) (considering parol evidence of the
father's intent "[a]s to the particular method of education").
189. See Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 24 Eng. Rep. 659, 661 (Ch. 1722) (questioning the
guardian's decision to send the infant to a "public school" (i.e., boarding school) on the
ground that "sending the infant to a public school... may be thought likely to instil into
him notions of slavery").
190. See Hal, 26 Eng. Rep. at 1213 (telling the infant that he had "no reasonable
grounds of complaint" against his school, and refusing to "indulge him in being put to a
private tutor, or going to another school," because "his guardian was the proper judge at
what school to place him, and where he had sent him, was a school of very great
reputation"). Often, the choice was between two equally good schools. In these cases, the
court would enforce the guardian's original choice, basing its decision, not on a finding
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nally, the court would make an order about where the infant was to attend school.19 1 In most cases, the court specified that its order as to
schooling was not final, and that the infant and guardians could reapply
92
to the court after a period of time if the school did not work out.'
c. Religion. - A particularly contentious aspect of the testamentary
guardianship was the infant's religious upbringing. Under the Tenures
Abolition Act, a father was forbidden to devise the guardianship of his
children to a "popish recusant," i.e., a Catholic. 193 But debates nevertheless arose, concerning Catholicism, Judaism, and other religions that deviated from the Protestant Church of England, such as Presbyterianism.
The court's official position in these cases was that the father's wishes as
to religion were paramount, but in practice it tended to intervene in
favor of those who wanted to raise a child in the religion of the Church of
England.
The court's opportunity to promote the Church of England arose
both when there was a dispute among guardians as to how to raise a
that a particular school was best for the infant, but on the reasoning that it would be
"dangerous" to allow a young scholar to change schools at whim, as he should learn to
submit to the authority of his schoolmaster. Anonymous, 28 Eng. Rep. 240, 240 (Ch. 1751)
(consulting a young woman over the age of sixteen about where she wished to reside, and
distinguishing the case at hand from a situation involving a "scholar," in which instance it
'would be very dangerous" to take his wishes into account, because "a scholar might then
apply to change his school as not liking it").
191. In the case of a recalcitrant ward, the court might send an officer of the court to
escort the infant there. See Tremain's Case, 93 Eng. Rep. at 452 (ordering an infant, who
went to Oxford, contrary to the orders of his guardian, to attend Cambridge instead); id.
("[T]he court sent a messenger, to carry him from Oxford to Cambridge. And upon his
returning to Oxford there went another, tam to carry him to Cambridge, quam to keep
him there.").
192. See Beaufort, 24 Eng. Rep. at 580 (suspending a past order that an infant transfer
from the Westminster school to Eton upon a petition arguing that the infant "was
recovered in his health, and had made a considerable progress in the school, and that a
new method of instructing him might retard his learning," but warning infant "that while
he behaved himself well and regularly at Westminster (which it was not doubted but he
would do) he should stay there; but if otherwise, the Court would remove him to Eton");
see also Storke v. Storke, 24 Eng. Rep. 965, 966 (Ch. 1730) (following an order that the
Master inquire whether the school at which the wards were placed was "a good and proper
school for their education" by "giving liberty to all parties to apply to the court as there
should be occasion").
193. See supra note 152. For an example of how the court dealt with a situation
where the father had appointed a guardian whom others suspected of being a Catholic, see
Shaftsbury v. Hannam, 23 Eng. Rep. 177, 177 (Ch. 1677), where the court threatened to
remove a child from a testamentary guardian who was suspected of being a papist but
denied the same, unless she "receive the Sacrament according to the Rites of the Church
of England, before the End of the next Term, and produce a legal Certificate thereof."
The issue of religion was further complicated by several statutes which limited the rights of
Catholics andJews to practice and teach their religions. Under I jam., ch. 4 (1603), it was
illegal for anyone to educate a child as a Catholic, or to send a child overseas for the
purpose of receiving a Catholic education. Under 11 & 12 Will. 3, ch. 4 (1700), it was
illegal for a Catholic parent to punish his or her child for converting to Protestantism, and
1 Anne, ch. 30 (1702) extended this law to Jewish parents.
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child 194 and when there was a dispute about whom the father had appointed as guardian. 195 In such instances, the court did its utmost to
place infants in the situation most likely to ensure a Protestant upbringing. It could supplement its power to influence religious upbringing by
issuing orders that no Catholics be allowed to visit or otherwise communicate with an infant.'9 6 These orders could even limit a child's interaction
197
with his or her mother.
194. Thus, in Storke, a Presbyterian father had devised the guardianship of his three
daughters to his three Presbyterian brothers and to one clergyman in the Church of
England without specifying in his will in which religion the children should be brought up.
The clergyman took hold of the two youngest children and installed them in a boarding
school where they would be brought up in the Church of England, and petitioned the
court to order that the eldest daughter be placed there as well, "praying, that the court
would give directions for the education of the three infant daughters in the way and
principles of the church of England." 24 Eng. Rep. at 965. The three brothers counterpetitioned that the two daughters be delivered to them, offering proof that their brother
had intended his daughters to be raised as Presbyterians. The court noted that it could not
prohibit the education of children as Presbyterians, as the statutory laws on religious
education pertained only to Catholicism. But it managed to mandate that the children be
brought up within the English church by prohibiting the introduction of parol evidence
on the subject of religion, with the result that the two younger children were ordered to
remain at the school chosen by the clergyman. See id. That the court's use of the parol
evidence rule in Storke was an excuse to achieve a desired result is evident in light of the
fact that it regularly allowed parol evidence on other subjects, such as the father's wishes
regarding his children's education. See supra note 188.
195. Chancery's bias can be seen by comparing two similar cases with different results.
In Teynhan v. Lennard, 2 Eng. Rep. 204 (H.L. 1724), a father died while his child was still
unborn, and did not appoint a testamentary guardian by written will. The care of the child
fell to his mother, a Catholic. Six years into the child's life, his relatives petitioned to have
him removed from his mother, on the ground that the father had made a deathbed
declaration asking his own father, a Protestant, to ensure that the unborn child be brought
up a Protestant. When the issue came to court, the court ruled that the deathbed
declaration, although not in writing and not heard by any but the grandfather, constituted
a valid appointment of a testamentary guardian, and ordered the child delivered over to
the grandfather.
On the other hand, in the case of Villareal v. Mellish, 36 Eng. Rep. 719 (Ch. 1737),
where ajewish father had similarly failed to devise the guardianship of his children, but an
informal agreement had been reached that they should reside with their Jewish
grandfather, upon the mother's remarriage to a Christian and conversion to Christianity,
the court found that the devise of guardianship to the grandfather was not valid. Here, the
court professed not to decide on the basis of religion alone, but on the right of
guardianship in conjunction with religion: "Much has been said on the point of religion;
holds the true state of the question to be, whether this court shall not take the infants out
of the hands of a person who has no right of guardianship, and put them into the hands of
the person who has the right, and is of the religion of this country?" Id. at 722. The court
then stated that, when in doubt, it preferred to decide on the basis "that the Christian
religion is part of the law of the land." Id.
196. See Blake v. Leigh, 27 Eng. Rep. 207, 207 (Ch. 1756) (ordering "no person, not
professing the Protestant religion, to have access to" the infant).
197. See id. (allowing an exception, upon petition by the infant's mother, to the
courts earlier injunction prohibiting Catholics from having access to the infant, but
limiting her interaction with her child to six visits a year in the presence of his guardian,
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d. Location. - Whenever a case arose in which it seemed that a
guardian might remove a child from the Court of Chancery's jurisdiction,
that is, from England, the Court of Chancery used it power over testamentary guardians to prevent such an outcome. Guardians were required to petition the court for permission before removing an infant
ward from the country.' 9 8 Where a visit out of the country was allowed,
the court often demanded a security deposit to ensure the infant's return
to England. 199 But often the court would deny the request to remove an
infant ward from its jurisdiction, even for a short visit.200 It was even less
likely to permit a child to be brought out of the country for a longer
20 1
period of time.
e. ParentalAccess. - The Court of Chancery often acted upon the
principle that testamentary guardians should instill in their wards a respectful attitude toward their parents. 20 2 In the case of a guardian who
cared for the child of a living parent, the court could require that the
parent be allowed access to the child. 20 3 The court had a wide discretion
in regulating parental access, and its decisions ranged from ordering that
a child be returned to his mother's home every night, 20 4 to ordering that
a mother be allowed access as often as she wished, 20 5 to requiring that a
20 6
mother be permitted six visits a year, under supervision.
2. The Basis of Chancery's Decisions. - The Court of Chancery enjoyed a wide discretion in determining how the testamentary guardianships should be managed. The basis for its decisions was usually whatever
and forbidding her from sending her son any letters which had not first been perused by
the guardian).
198. See Campbell v. Mackay, 40 Eng. Rep. 552 (Ch. 1837).
199. See Jeffrys v. Vanteswarstwarth, 27 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ch. 1740) (ordering a security
deposit to insure infants' return from visit overseas).
200. See Mountstuart v. Mountstuart, 31 Eng. Rep. 1095 (Gh. 1801) (refusing a
guardian's petition to take his ward to Scotland during the vacation).
201. In Campbell, 40 Eng. Rep. at 554, the testamentary guardian, the children's
mother, backed up her request to raise her children abroad with medical testimony to the
effect that the children needed to be raised in a warmer climate. The court disputed the
findings of the mother's medical experts, concluding that the children would be just as
well off in the mild and dry air of the South of England. Citing "the well-established rule
of the Court... against permitting an infant ward... to be taken out of the jurisdiction,"
the court explained that to remain in England was always in the best interests of an English
child, as "scarcely anything can be more injurious to the future prospects of English
children ... than a permanent residence abroad," because such an infant, "accustomed to
habits and manners which are not those of their own country... must be becoming, from
day to day, less and less adapted to the position which, it is to be wished, they should
hereafter occupy in their native land." Id. at 553.
202. "[I]mplanting in the hearts of the children filial and dutiful feelings towards the
parent" was considered "the best and most important duty imposed upon the guardian by
the deceased parent." Ex parte U]chester, 32 Eng. Rep. 142, 154 (Ch. 1803).
203. See Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (Ch. 1722); see also Blake v. Leigh, 27
Eng. Rep. 207 (Ch. 1756); Morgan v. Dillon, 88 Eng. Rep. 361 (Ch. 1724).
204. See Eyre, 24 Eng. Rep. at 661.
205. See Morgan, 88 Eng. Rep. at 366.
206. See Blake, 27 Eng. Rep. at 207.
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the court determined to be "for the benefit of the infant." 20 7 This standard usually assumed that it was in a child's best interests to acquire as
much rank and fortune as possible. 20 8 Where "the benefit of the infant"
was not measurable in terms of fortune or rank, the court's discretion was
unbounded. Sometimes, in the case of an older female ward, the judge
might question the infant herself about where and how she preferred to
be raised. 20 9 But for the most part, the court could and did make decisions on whatever basis it felt "proper."2 10 The decisions made in these
cases tended to be those that favored the ward's inculcation into the cus21 1
toms and religion of England, requiring that the ward live in England,
21 2
study at an English school,
and learn to practice the official English
2 13
religion.
The other standard occasionally advanced by the court as the basis of
its decisions in regulating testamentary guardianships was that it acted,
207. Morgan, 88 Eng. Rep. at 361, 365 ("[Since] a testamentary guardian is under the
control and inspection of a Court of Equity, as superintendant of all guardianships... this
Court... may compel him to do any ... act which may be thought necessary for the
benefit of the infant."); see also Jeffrys v. Vanteswarstwarth, 27 Eng. Rep. 588, 588 (Ch.
1740) (ordering the "Method of Inquiry, as is always done where the Interest of Infants is
concerned, namely, to refer it to a Master to examine whether it is for their Benefit or
not"). The "benefit of the infant" standard was occasionally phrased in the negative, so
that the court would act to prevent the guardian from acting "to the prejudice of the
infant." Beaufort v. Berty, 24 Eng. Rep. 579, 580 (Ch. 1721); see also Smith v. Smith, 26
Eng. Rep. 977, 978 (Ch. 1745) ("This jurisdiction is exercised by way of punishment,
sometimes on such as have done any act to the prejudice of infants; and likewise more
usefully exercised to restrain persons from doing any thing to disparage infants, where the
act has not yet been completed.").
208. See, e.g., Smith, 26 Eng. Rep. at 978 (considering "fortune" and "rank"); Gordon
v. Irwin, 29 Eng. Rep. 241 (Ch. 1781) (refusing permission to marry where the proposed
husband did not have an independent fortune). Where a guardian married his nine-yearold ward, heir to a significant fortune, to his own son, an apprentice to a peruke-maker,
the distance in station between the ward and her spouse was so extreme that the
disadvantageous nature of the marriage was not even a subject of debate. See Goodall v.
Harris, 24 Eng. Rep. 862, 863 (Ch. 1729) (finding a breach of duty where a guardian
married the ward to one "who was worth nothing"). Where the spouses were equal in
"family and quality," but not in "portion and fortune," the court was more hesitant to
condemn a marriage, since "portion and fortune ... is not the material ingredient in the
happiness of the married life," Smith, 26 Eng. Rep. at 978, but often did so nonetheless.
Explaining its preference for marriages where the spouses were equal in both rank and
wealth, the court reasoned that to secure a ward a fortune equal to his or her own was to
act "by way of analogy to the care and prudence of the natural parent," since "parents
always take care that such provision shall be made.., as will enable infants to live in the
world suitable to that rank to which their birth intitles them." Id.
209. See Storke v. Storke, 24 Eng. Rep. 965 (Ch. 1730) (sending for the eldest of
three wards to be brought into court, and asking her where she preferred to be placed,
and upon her stating that she desired to stay where she was, allowing her to continue
there).
210. See id. at 966.
211. See supra Part Il.C.l.d.
212. See supra Part II.C.l.b.
213. See supra Part II.C.l.c.
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not in the interests of the child, but in the interests of the general public.
This standard applied where a child stood to become a peer of the realm,
that is, a member of the House of Lords. 214 In these cases, the court
proclaimed that its interest in the child's welfare was especially strong,
explaining that "the public was interested" where the child was to become
one of England's leaders.2 1 5 The application of this "public interest"
standard, however, led to an outcome identical to that obtained by the
application of the "benefit of the infant" standard. In the public interest
cases, just as in the benefit of the infant cases, the court inevitably found
that a ward should be brought up in a "proper"2 1 6 manner.
3. The Exercise of Chancery'sAuthority. - The Court of Chancery employed a wide variety of mechanisms to enforce its control over testamentary guardianships. Although the court later began to claim that its control over testamentary guardians was exercised primarily through its
power to dispense the ward's property,2 17 and thus to determine how
much was to be spent for the infant's education and maintenance,2 18 usually the mechanisms of the court's control did not involve the ward's
property. It could, and frequently did, issue a contempt of court against
guardians and third parties who disobeyed its orders. This writ of contempt could be followed with an order that the offending parties be held
prisoners at the Fleet until the court decided to release them, or it could,
alternatively, lead to a sequestration of the offending party's property.
Both of these methods were primarily intended to force the offender to

comply with the court's order, or to reach a settlement by which the of-

fender would pay for any damage done, 21 9 but could also serve as punish214. See Beaufort v. Berty, 24 Eng. Rep. 579 (Ch. 1721); see also Eyre v. Shaftsbury 24
Eng. Rep. 659 (Ch. 1722).
215. See Beaufort, 24 Eng. Rep. at 579 ("[N]lothing could be of greater concern than
the education of infants, and more especially of this noble lord, in whom the publick was
interested, and from whom his prince and country might justly have expectations."); Eyre,
24 Eng. Rep. at 662 ("[T]he present case is still of a higher nature, as it is the case of a peer
").
of the realm, in whose education the public is interested ...
216. Eyre, 24 Eng. Rep. at 662.
217. See Wellesley v. Beaufort, 38 Eng. Rep. 236, 243 (Ch. 1827) (reasoning that if
most cases regulating testamentary guardians have involved children with property, this is
"not, however, from any want of jurisdiction" in the absence of property,- but rather,
because "this Court has not the means of acting, except where it has property to act
upon").
218. The general rule was that a guardian could spend only the income from an
infant's estate, and not the capital. See Anstis v. Gandy, 2 Eng. Rep. 212, 216 (Ch. 1735).
Where a guardian felt it necessary to spend part of the capital as well, he or she could
petition the Court of Chancery for permission to do so. See, e.g., Anstis, 2 Eng. Rep. at 215
(refusing guardian's petition for an exception from "the general rule whereby guardians
are restrained from exceeding in expences the income of the infant's fortune"); Ex parte
Petre, 32 Eng. Rep. 163 (Ch. 1802) (regulating the amount of money to be taken from the
wards' inheritance for the purpose of maintenance and education).
219. See, e.g., Bathurst v. Murray, 32 Eng. Rep. 279, 280 (Ch. 1802) (holding husband
of ward in prison until satisfactory marriage settlement reached).
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ment. 220 In aggravated instances, the court could also order an information against a guardian or third party, and subject him or her to criminal
penalties. 22 1 And where a guardian had irremediably breached his or her
trust to care for a ward, or become incompetent to carry out the guardiother
anship, the court could remove him or her altogether, and, if no 222
guardian remained, appoint another guardian in his or her stead.
III. THE REGuLAnTION OF FATHERS
In the second half of the eighteenth century, the Court of Chancery
employed an analogy between testamentary guardians and fathers to extend its jurisdiction to include the supervision of fathers themselves. The
development, however, occurred gradually, with no case reaching more
than a step or two beyond the last. This Part will trace that development.
It shows how the legitimacy ofjudicial regulation of fathers began in dicta
and then emerged as the law in a subset of cases in which a father was
found to have waived his rights. The Note will then describe how the
court extended its regulation beyond this subset, first to fathers who
breached financial duties to their children, a comparatively objective inquiry, and then to fathers who in the view of the court breached their
more general paternal duties.
A. Early Dicta ConcerningInterference with PaternalRights
Even the earliest cases regulating testamentary guardianships had included dicta stating that the Court of Chancery could regulate fathers as
well as guardians. In the important early case of Beaufort v. Berty, the
Lord Chancellor stated that he "would and had interposed, even in the
case of a father,"2 23 citing Kiffin v. Kiffin, where the court had prevented
a father from taking the profits of his son's estate. 224 Similarly, Morgan v.
Dillon225 justified its intervention in a testamentary guardianship by citing
220. See Eyre, 24 Eng. Rep. at 663.
221. See Goodall v. Harris, 24 Eng. Rep. 862, 863 (Ch. 1729).
222. See id. at 862 (removing testamentary guardian for breach of duty, and
remanding wards to custody of other guardian); see also Morgan v. Dillon, 88 Eng. Rep.
361 (Ch. 1724) (removing testamentary guardian for breach of trust, and appointing
another in her stead, upon her remarriage), rev'd sub nom. Dillon v. Mount-Cashell, 2
Eng. Rep. 207 (H.L. 1727) (reversing on the grounds that the guardian's remarriage did
not constitute a breach of trust); Roach v. Garvan, 27 Eng. Rep. 954, 956 (Ch. 1748) ("The
court sometimes, though rarely, removes a testamentary guardian"); Smith v. Bate, 21 Eng.
Rep. 416 (Ch. 1784) (removing testamentary guardian for bankruptcy, and appointing
another person in his stead). But see Foster v. Denny, 22 Eng. Rep. 925 (Ch. 1677)
(holding that the court cannot remove a testamentary guardian); Ingham v. Bickerdike, 56
Eng. Rep. 1096, 1096 (Ch. 1822) ("IT]he Court will not make an order to remove a
testamentary guardian; but a proper case being made, the Court will... appoint some
other person to superintend the maintenance and education of the infant.").
223. 24 Eng. Rep. 579, 579-80 (Ch. 1721).
224. Unreported case, cited in Beaufort, 24 Eng. Rep. at 580.
225. 88 Eng. Rep. 361, 365 (Ch. 1724).
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Roberts v. Roberts, another case in which a father was prevented from taking the profits from his child's estates. 22 6 The reasoning in Morgan was
that since "the father... is the root out of which all other guardians
spring," if a father could be "removed," as had happened in Roberts, "then
certainly a derivative guardian may be removed, for he can have no
greater privilege or immunity than a primitive and original guardian
from whom he derived." 22 7 But, in fact, the regulation of guardians in
Beaufort and Morgan went far beyond any regulation that had ever been
imposed upon a father. Whereas Kiffen and Roberts concerned only the
management of a child's property, Beaufort, Morgan, and the cases that
followed concerned the management of the child himself.
The analogy between fathers and testamentary guardians made in
Beaufort and Morgan, serving as it did to justify the new regulation of testamentary guardianships that these cases helped to initiate, was soon forgotten. Until 1756, in Butler v. Freeman,228 no court again mentioned its
power to regulate fathers themselves. Butler involved a living father who
had allowed a third party to take on the guardianship of his child. The
child had been seduced away from the guardian, and in response to a
petition by both guardian and father for a contempt of court for marrying a ward without leave, the seducer had argued that the Court of
Chancery could not enforce a guardian's rights where a father was alive,
since this would be tantamount to interfering in fatherhood. The Court
of Chancery responded by reversing the original analogy between fatherhood and testamentary guardianship set forth in Beaufort and Morgan.
These cases had reasoned that fathers had been removed, therefore so
too could guardians; but Butler reasoned that if testamentary guardians
were subject to regulation by the Court of Chancery, as they had been for
half a century, then so too were fathers: "It is admitted, the Court has
interfered where there has been a testamentary guardian. I see no difference between the cases. A testamentary guardian, by statute, has all the
2 29
remedies at law which a father has."
Although Butler did not itself interfere with a father's control of his
child, since the father in Butler had voluntarily relinquished this control,
the logic set forth in its dictum provided powerful ammunition for future
cases to regulate fathers against their wishes. Fatherhood soon came to
be seen in the same light as testamentary guardianship, that is, as a trust,
where a father's rights stemmed from the fulfillment of certain duties.
Upon a breach of these duties, a father lost his paternal rights.

226. 145 Eng. Rep. 399 (Exch. 1657) (prohibiting an infant's father from felling
timber on her property).
227. Morgan, 88 Eng. Rep. at 365.
228. 27 Eng. Rep. 204 (Ch. 1756).
229. Id. at 205.
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B. JudicialIntervention in Fatherhood. The Waiver of Rightsjustification
The first cases to justify termination of paternal rights involved situations in which the father was seen to have waived or even sold his rights
over his children, usually in exchange for a bequest of property either to
230
his children or to himself. In the pre-Butler case of Ex parte Hopkins,
the court rejected a claim that a father could waive his paternal rights by
accepting a legacy to his children. In Hopkins, a testator had left a legacy
to the three daughters of a living father, and had appointed his executor
to care for the girls and administer the legacy. The Lord Chancellor rejected the executor's claim of guardianship, stating that "it cannot be
conceived that, because another thinks fit to give a legacy, though never
so great, to my daughters, therefore I am by that means to be deprived of
23
a right which naturally belongs to me, that of being their guardian." '
Two days after Butler was decided, however, a case similar to Hopkins,
Blake v. Leigh,23 2 had very different results. In Blake, a grandfather left his
legacy to his grandson, whose father was still alive, and appointed a
guardian to care for the child. In response to the father's petition for
guardianship, the Blake court at first reiterated the ruling in Hopkins,
holding that "[t] he grandfather had no power to appoint guardians of his
grandson, it being a right vested in the father."233 But it went on to state
that a father could give up his vested right in his child by allowing the
grandfather to appoint a guardian in exchange for the legacy to the
child: "[A]ny one can give his estate on what conditions he pleases; and
the father has in this case submitted to the will." 23 4 By accepting the
legacy for his child, and agreeing to allow a guardian appointed to oversee the child's education, the father "had waived his parental right," and
this waiver Nwas irrevocable: "[H] ere is no ground to alter what was done
with the consent of all parties."23 5 Fatherhood was no longer an immutable status, but a contractual bundle of rights and duties.
After Blake, the court again upheld an express waiver of paternal
rights in exchange for a legacy in Colston v. Morris.23 6 Then, in Lyons v.
230. 24 Eng. Rep. 1009 (Ch. 1732).
231. Id. at 1009. That the court felt constrained to award guardianship to the father
rather than to the wealthy benefactors, but preferred a different outcome, is evident in the

fact that despite its holding reaffirming the father's guardianship, the court refused to
deliver the children over to their father on the technical ground that in order to obtain his
children he must pursue a proper legal remedy, i.e., a writ of habeas corpus, and even

forbade the father from attempting to obtain them through forceful means. See id. at
1010.
232. 27 Eng. Rep. 207 (Ch. 1756).
233. Id. at 207.

234. Id.
235. Id.
236. 37 Eng. Rep. 849 (Ch. 1820) (enforcing as binding a condition attached to a
legacy by which the father, in accepting the legacy, agreed not to interfere in his
daughter's education, and rejecting the father's claim that such a condition was in terrorem
and void).
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Blenkin,237 the court went further, finding an implied waiver of paternal
rights, even in the absence of any agreement concerning guardianship, in
the fact that the father had accepted a legacy for his children. The father
in Lyons had for a time permitted his children to reside with their aunt,
which was the preference of the children's wealthy grandmother, who
then died and bequeathed to the children a large fortune. Upon the
aunt's marriage, the father decided to ask that the children return to live
with him. The court refused on the grounds that, by consenting for a
time to allow the children to receive benefits paid for out of their grandmother's legacy, the father had implicitly relinquished his rights to them.
The Lyons court cast the exchange of a father's rights for a legacy as a sort
of sale: "[T]he testatrix, by the benefits she has given these children out
of her property, has purchased the power of educating them in the way
and under the controul and guardianship which she has pointed out, and
38
2
the parent has consented to."

C. JudicialIntervention in Fatherhood. The Breach of DutiesJustification
1. Breach ofDuty on FinancialGrounds. - It was in 1789, with Powel v.
Cleaver,2 39 that the Court of Chancery first extended Blake to find an abrogation of paternal rights in the absence of even an implied agreement
to relinquish those rights. In Powel, the court found that a father had
failed in his paternal duties, and therefore forfeited his paternal rights,
when he refused to let others control his child in exchange for a legacy.
Powel involved a father who rejected a legacy for his children when he
realized that it was granted upon the condition that his rights of guardianship be terminated. 240 The court refused the father permission to interfere with the education of his children as arranged by the executor, on
the grounds that the children had certain "expectations" that the legacy
had created, and must be educated in accordance with those expectations. Hesitant to admit the extent to which it thereby abrogated a father's rights to his child, the Powel court finessed the issue by refusing to
articulate the basis for its jurisdiction to do so. Citing Blake as precedent,
237. 37 Eng. Rep. 842 (Ch. 1821).
238. Id. at 847.
239. 29 Eng. Rep. 274 (Ch. 1789).
240. Powel, like Bake, involved a will with an express clause that conditioned a legacy
to infants upon their father's acquiescence in a transfer of guardianship. The father in
Powel at first allowed his children to accept the legacy. Three years later, however, the
father petitioned the court to assert his rights of guardianship, claiming that he had not at
first understood the condition on which the legacy had been granted, and now that he did,
would rather relinquish the legacy than give up his rights of guardianship. See id. at 277.
The executors' lawyers, on the other hand, claimed that Mr. Powel had understood from
the start the condition on which the legacy had been granted, and having acquiesced in it,
could not change his mind. It was to avoid resting the case upon this factual dispute that
the executors' lawyers decided to make the novel argument that "[iJt is material also to
consider whether a parent can insist upon his full right of guardianship, where by so
insisting on that right against the condition of a legacy to them, such a legacy may be
forfeited." Id. at 277.
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the court declared: "It is no where laid down that the guardianship of a
child can be wantonly be disposed of by a third person. The wisdom
would be not to raise points on such a question, as the Court will take
241
care that the child shall be properly educated for his expectations."
The effect of Powel was immense. Despite its reluctance to admit the
revolutionary basis of its decision, Powel was widely considered to have
established the principle that where a father refused to allow his child a
wealthier lifestyle than the one he himself could provide, then he failed
to pay "due attention to the interests of the child,"2 42 and thereby lost his
paternal rights. This principle was used in a series of cases removing children from their fathers on the grounds of bankruptcy. In Creuze v.
Hunter, the court ordered a father "restrained from interfering with the
management of his child" where the father was bankrupt and the child
was heir to a significant estate, on the ground that it "would not allow the
child to be sacrificed to the views of the father." 243 Similar orders against
bankrupt fathers were made shortly thereafter in Giffard v. Giffard244 and
246
Ex parte Warner, 245 and later in Ex parte Mounfor.
But Powel also initiated a new model of interference in fatherhood,
one that extended beyond cases involving money alone. Powel removed
children from their father on the basis that in refusing a legacy for them,
he was no longer acting as a father should. As later explained in de Manneville v. de Manneville,2 47 Powel therefore stood for the larger proposition
that wherever a father had breached his duty to his child, he thereby lost
his paternal rights. The court's explanation is so sweeping that it is worth
quoting in full:
[Tihe Law imposed a duty upon parents; and in general gives
them a credit for ability and inclination to execute it. But that
presumption, like all others would fail in particular instances;
and if an instance occurred, in which the father was unable, or
unwilling, to execute that duty, and, farther, was actively proceeding against it, of necessity the State must place somewhere a
superintending power over those, who cannot take care of them241. Id. at 279.
242. De Manneville v. de Manneville, 32 Eng. Rep. 762, 767 (Ch. 1804) (explaining
Powel and other cases).
243. 30 Eng. Rep. 113 (Ch. 1790) (restraining an insolvent father from interfering in
his son's education or taking him abroad, where the son was under the management of

guardians arranged by his mother).
244. See Giffard v. Giffard, an unreported case cited as "a late... cause... before the
Lord Chancellor" in the 1790 report of Blisset's Case, 98 Eng. Rep. 899, 900 (K.B. 1784)

(removing child from bankrupt father).
245. 29 Eng. Rep. 799 (Ch. 1792) (citing Powel and Creuze as precedent, and ordering
a bankrupt father, who had also exhibited cruel behavior toward the mother, restrained

from removing his three children from the schools at which their mother had placed them
and taking them into his own custody).
246. 33 Eng. Rep. 822 (Ch. 1809) (appointing a guardian to supersede an insolvent

father).
247. 32 Eng. Rep. 762 (Ch. 1804).
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selves; and have not the benefit of that care, which is presumed
to be generally effectual. In [Powel] there was a struggle between the feelings of the father and a due attention to the interests of the child .... [The Lord Chancellor] took upon him the
jurisdiction on this ground, that he would not suffer the feelings
of the parents to have effect against that duty, which upon a
tender, just, and legitimate, deliberation the parent owed to the
true interests of the child; and [therefore] separated the person
of the child from the father. 248
Once Powel had extended Blake to allow abrogation of paternal rights
where a father refused a legacy to his sons, the court could, in effect,
stand in the father's place, and judge what was best for his child. If the

court's opinion differed from that of the father, then the father had
breached his duties toward his child and lost his rights to fatherhood.
2. Breach of Duty on Non-FinancialGrounds. - In 1804, with de Mannevi//e,24 9 the Court of Chancery for the first time found a breach of paternal duties on a basis other than a purely financial one. In the cases
that had come before, the court's discretion to interfere in fatherhood
had been exercised in a predictable manner: Children were better off
with wealthier guardians. In these cases, "better" was measured by the
objective standard of wealth. But de Manneville, and the cases that followed it, allowed the court to regulate fatherhood on the basis of a newly
250
unbounded interpretation of "the interests of the child."
De Manneville involved a French father and a British mother who had
literally snatched a child back and forth. The mother petitioned the
Court of Chancery to force the father to deliver the child to her. The
248. Id. at 767.
249. In de Manneville, the court refused the mother's petition for the custody of her
child, but agreed to restrain the father from removing the child out of the country. Before
petitioning the Court of Chancery to intervene on behalf of her child, the mother in
de Manneville had attempted to achieve the same result by filing a writ of habeas corpus in a
court of common law. See Rex v. de Manneville, 102 Eng. Rep. 1054 (KB. 1804) (refusing
to deliver child to custody of the mother, or to restrain the father in any way, on the
ground that the father has the legal right to custody). As the Lord Chancellor in
de Manneville stated in reference to this earlier petition,
The Court of King's Bench, when the child was brought up by Habeas Corpus,
declined to interfere; and I am not surprised at it;
for that Court has not within it
by its constitution any of that species of delegated authority, that exists in the
King, as Parens Patriae;and resides in this Court, as representing his Majesty.
32 Eng. Rep. at 765. The difference between the two de Manneville cases illustrates the
principle articulated in Rex v. Smith, 93 Eng. Rep. 983 (K.B. 1734), that upon a writ of
habeas corpus, a court of common law cannot make any decision altering the right of
guardianship itself. Even in Rex v. Delaval, 97 Eng. Rep. 913 (K.B. 1763), often cited as
evidence of the extent to which an English court of common law would interfere with a
father's custody rights, the court did not make any decision regarding the abrogation of
those rights, but merely refused to enforce them, holding that the court could, at its
discretion, refuse to order a child returned to the father. For a discussion of how the
different procedural postures of the two de Manneville cases has confused scholars, see
supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
250. De Manneville, 32 Eng. Rep. at 767.
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court refused to deliver the child to the mother, on the ground that to do
so would be to sanction her illegal separation from her husband. 25 1 But
it decided that once the case had been brought before it, it could make
any decision which would be in the child's best interests: "[T] he petition
being presented on the part of an infant, the Court will do what is for the
benefit of the infant, without regard to the prayer."252 Reading Powel,
Warner, and Creuze as support for the principle that where a father was
"unwilling, or unable, to execute that duty... [which he] owed to the
true interests of the child," the Court of Chancery could "control the
right of the father... to the person of the child,"253 the de Manneville
court took matters into its own hands, attending not only to the possibility of the infant's being removed from the country, but "also to the way,
in which the child should be brought up," in order to determine "what is
fit to be done with the person of the child."25 4 After considering all aspects of the situations of the child, mother, and father, the court ruled
that the child would remain with the father, but the father was to be
prohibited from removing his child out of England.25 5 Less important
than the actual decision was the freedom the court felt in coming to this
decision. At the same time that the court noted its right to interfere on
the child's behalf, it admitted that it was not presented with any clear
indication of how it should proceed to do so: "In the situation of this
child it is extremely difficult not to interpose; and it is also extremely
difficult to say, how the Court is to interpose."2 56 The court's discretion
was unbounded by any objective measurement.
The Court of Chancery repeatedly found a breach of trust sufficient
to abrogate paternal rights, in cases not involving financial grounds, from
1804 to 1839.257 The most pronounced instance ofjudicial discretion to
interfere in fatherhood was the case of Wellesley v. Beaufort.2 58 As Mr. Wel251. See id. at 765-66.
252. Id. at 765.
253. Id. at 767.
254. Id. at 766.
255. See id. at 767-68.
256. Id. at 767.
257. One well-known instance of judicial interference in paternal rights on nonfinancial grounds involved the poet Percy Bysshe Shelley, who after the death of his
abandoned wife tried to obtain custody of his children. He was refused on the basis both
of his "immoral conduct," i.e. adultery, and of his atheistic principles, which he had
avowed in written tracts and refused to recant, both of which the court considered
"inconsistent with the duties of persons in such relations of life," i.e., fathers. Shelley v.
Westbrooke, 37 Eng. Rep. 850, 851 (Ch. 1817). Sheley created the rule that the moral
education of children is of greater importance than their financial interests. Responding
to Shelley's assertion that the removal of his children from his custody would in fact
adversely affect their financial interests, the court replied that "to such interests I cannot
sacrifice what I deem to be interests of greater value and higher importance." Id. at 852;
see also Whitfield v. Hales, 3 Eng. Rep. 186 (Ch. 1806) (removing children from a father's
custody and appointing a guardian in his stead, on grounds of in treatment).
258. 38 Eng. Rep. 236 (Ch. 1827).
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lesley fought for the custody of his children, first in the Court of Chancery, then in the House of Lords, and finally when he was sentenced to
imprisonment for removing one of his children from her appointed
guardian,25 9 his case generated an extended debate on the subject ofjudicial interference in paternal rights. 2 60 In the course of this debate, the
Court of Chancery, and then the House of Lords, reviewed the case law
regulating testamentary guardianship, and explicitly reaffirmed the applicability of the principles developed in those cases to fatherhood itself. It
came to the conclusion that fatherhood is, like testamentary guardianship, a trust, and as such subject to judicial regulation.
What shocked the public about Wellesley was that here, unlike in previous cases, the Court of Chancery removed custody from a father who
was both wealthy and extremely attentive to his children. Mr. Wellesley
had always been involved in his children's upbringing, selecting servants
to care for them, overseeing their schoolwork on a regular basis, and instructing them regularly on how to behave. 261 His road to losing custody
of his children began when he entered into an adulterous affair with a
married woman. Upon discovering the affair, Wellesley's wife initiated
proceedings in an ecclesiastical court for a legal separation, but died soon
thereafter. Upon Mrs. Wellesley's death, her relatives initiated a suit in
the Court of Chancery to remove the children from the custody of their
father, on the basis that his immoral behavior had poisoned his wife and
would eventually destroy his children as well. When the Court of Chancery granted the petition on the basis that Mr. Wellesley lived a profligate
life overseas, Mr. Wellesley responded by purchasing a house in London
of which he thought the court would approve as well-suited for raising his
259. See Mr. Long Wellesley's Case, 39 Eng. Rep. 538 (Ch. 1831) (ordering the
imprisonment of Mr. Wellesley for disobeying a court order not to interfere with the
custody of his children).
260. The Wellesley controversy generated two pamphlets and several periodical articles
debating the subject of judicial interference in paternal rights. See James Ram,
Observations on the Natural Right of a Father to the Custody of His Children, and to
Direct Their Education; His Forfeiture of this Right; and the Jurisdiction of the Court of
Chancery to Control It (London, A. Maxwell 1828) (approving of the exercise of
Chancery's jurisdiction over fathers as a necessary element of a civilized state);
Observations upon the Power Exercised by the Court of Chancery, of Depriving a Father of
the Custody of his Children 1, 48 (London, John Miller 1828) (describing the decision in
Wellesley as "one of the most important ever pronounced," and attacking the Court of
Chancery's assertion of its right to deprive a father of the custody of his children as an
"extraordinary and fearful jurisdiction" which "comes home to the heart of every Father
attached to his children"). The anonymous pamphlet argued that the first case to extend
the regulation of testamentary guardians was Powel in 1789, and questioned the logic of
this extension: "[T]he power to take a child from his parent seems to be of very
questionable policy, and, at all events, is of very recent origin, if it be the fact, that it cannot
be carried farther back than the year 1789." Id. at 48; see also Abstract of Authorities
Relating to the Wellesley Case, 1 Law Mag. 309, 309-18 (1829) (refraining from coming
down pro or con, but instead reviewing the cases in which the Court of Chancery's
jurisdiction to remove fathers originated).
261. See Wellesley, 38 Eng. Rep. at 241.
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children, and submitting his plans to educate and care for them. But the
court nevertheless persisted in its refusal to grant him custody, on the
ground of not only his immoral conduct in committing adultery, but also
262
the general "tenor and bent of his mind."
In refusing to grant custody to Mr. Wellesley, the court admitted that
separating a father from his children is an action "of the most serious and
important nature," and that the judge who makes such an order must
exercise "the utmost anxiety to be right."263 To justify the power of the
Court of Chancery to take such a drastic step, the Wellesley court reviewed
the entire history of the Court of Chancery's interference in guardianship. Referring obliquely to the Tenures Abolition Act, the court noted
that it had been over a century since the Court of Chancery had, in
Beaufort v. Berty, established its authority to regulate the testamentary
guardianships created under that act.264 It then cited a string of cases
that had extended this regulation to fatherhood: Powel v. Cleaver, Creuze
v. Hunter, and de Manneville v. de Manneville.265 The Wellesley court
thereby concluded that interference by the Court of Chancery in paternal
26 6
rights was "long settled by judicial practice" to be "the law of the land."
Citing as precedent the cases regulating testamentary guardianship
and the cases that extended this to the regulation of fatherhood, the Wellesley court read these cases as not only permitting the Court of Chancery
to interfere in fatherhood, but in fact imposing upon the court a duty to
do so. The Lord Chancellor proclaimed: "I cannot now retire from the
discharge of this duty-I dare not violate the principles which grow out of
the practice of the Court. My duty is to apply those principles honestly; to
look diligently to all the circumstances of the case, and.., to determine
262. Id. at 251. Among the examples cited by the court as evidence of Mr. Wellesley's
unacceptable principles is the fact that he frequently swore, and encouraged his children
to swear. The court describes an incident in which, while vacationing in France, Mr.
Wellesley invited street children to come to the window to teach his children to swear in
French, and encouraged his own children to teach the others to swear in English. See id.
at 249.
263. Id. at 243.
264. See id. at 236, citing Beaufort v. Berty, 24 Eng. Rep. 579 (Ch. 1721). The

Wellesley court wrote:
The law makes the father the guardian of his children by nature and by nurture.
An act of Parliament has given the father the power of appointing a testamentary
guardian for them: one should think that the guardian so appointed must have
all the authority that Parliament could give him; and his authority is, perhaps, as
strong as any authority that any law could give. But it is above a century ago,
since, in the case of Duke of Beaufort v. Berty, the Lord Chancellor of that day, Lord
Macclesfield, determined, that the statute-guardian was subject to all the

jurisdiction of this Court.
Wellesley, 38 Eng. Rep. at 244-45 (citations omitted).
265. Id. at 244 (citing Powel v. Cleaver, 29 Eng. Rep. 274 (Ch. 1789); Creuze v.
Hunter, 30 Eng. Rep. 113 (Ch. 1790); and de Manneville v. de Manneville, 32 Eng. Rep.
762 (Ch. 1804)).
266. Wel!esley, 38 Eng. Rep. at 243.
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manfully, and manfully to declare what my opinion is." 2 67 A father was

burdened with "the duty of a parent," and this duty included providing
his children with "a moral and religious education," considered "the
foundation of all that is valuable." 268 And the Court of Chancery had
2 69
"the imperious duty" to ensure that the father fulfill his.
Upon appeal, the House of Lords affirmed Wellesley, and in doing so
affirmed that fatherhood is subject to the regulation of the Court of
Chancery because it is a trust. 270 The decision opens by setting forth the
rule that the father's right to his children is premised on his duty to act as
trustee in their guardianship, and if he fails in that duty he loses his
rights. 27 1 The House of Lords justified the Court of Chancery's jurisdiction to regulate the trust of fatherhood by referring to the power of
272
Chancery to regulate the trust of testamentary guardianship.
Asking "why is the conduct of the father not to be considered as a
trust, as well as the conduct of a person appointed as guardian?" the
House of Lords concluded that if the Court of Chancery could regulate
testamentary guardianships, then so too could it regulate fatherhood,
which the law "has always considered.., as a trust."2 73 It explained, "a

father is entrusted with the care of the children;... he is entrusted with it
for this reason, because, it is to be supposed, his natural affection would
2 74
make him the most proper person to discharge that trust."

267. Id. at 244.
268. Id. at 247.
269. Id. at 247.
270. See Wellesley v. Wellesley, 4 Eng. Rep. 1078 (H.L. 1828).
271. The House of Lords stated:
The opposition [to Chancery's decision] is founded on the right of the father to
have the care and custody of his children. That right is not disputed by the order,

but the question is, whether the father having that right, is to be at liberty to
abuse that right. That is the real question. Why is the parent entrusted with the
care of his children? Because it is generally supposed he will best execute the
trust reposed in him; for that it is a trust, of all trusts the most sacred, none of
your Lordships can doubt.
Id. at 1080.
272. The House of Lords reasoned as follows:
If a guardian is appointed under the statute, which enables the father to appoint
a guardian, the counsel at the bar have not disputed that is a trust; it is a
delegated trust; a trust, which the law has enabled the father, when he ceases to
live, to give to others for the benefit of his children; but if the father abuses that
trust, if he appoints improper persons to be the guardians of his children, is it
doubted, that a court ofjustice can interfere... ?
Id.
273. Id. at 1081, 1084.
274. Id. at 1084-85. The court-in both the Chancery case and the appealemphasized its power to remove fathers by quoting with disdain Mr. Wellesley's own
opinion that " ' a man and his children ought to be allowed to go to the devil their own way,
if he pleases.'" Id. at 1083. Both versions of Wellesley emphatically rejected this assertion of
fathers' rights.
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While the House of Lords' decision in Wellesley reaffirmed the trust
rationale for regulating fatherhood, the Lords themselves did not entirely
understand the origins of the Court of Chancery's power. Indeed, in a
revealing statement, the House of Lords rested its holding largely on
tradition:
If it were necessary to go back into times long past, to examine
the grounds on which every law is administered in this country,
before it could be considered as legally administered, we should
be involved in very great difficulties. But what has been the
practice for a great number of years, has been held, not in this
country alone, but in all countries, to be a ground for supposing
that it was rightly done, on this supposition, that if it had been
it would not have been permitted to be
wrongly done,
27 5
continued.
The House of Lords' conclusion that "if it had been wrongly done, it
would not have been permitted to be continued" is incorrect, for as this
Note has shown, the Court of Chancery's power to control fatherhood
arose from a statute that was originally intended to increase paternal
rights.
CONCLUSION

In 1839, Parliament passed the Custody of Infants Act, which allowed
judges, in certain situations, to override fathers' custody rights by awarding custody or visitation rights to mothers. Those who fought for the
passage of that Act treated it as the first English statute to arm judges
against the previously inviolable "empire of the father," and historians
ever since have believed this to be the case. As this Note has shown, however, a regime ofjudicial intervention in paternal custody was already in
place by 1839, and this regime originated with another statute, the 1660
Tenures Abolition Act.
If historians have overlooked the importance of the Tenures Abolition Act in empowering English judges to remove children from their
fathers, this is perhaps because it was actually designed to strengthen fathers' rights. The Tenures Abolition Act allowed fathers to appoint
guardians to their children by will. When, in the early 1700s, the Court of
Chancery took on itself the task of supervising testamentary guardians, it
did so in order to ensure that after a father died, his children would be
brought up as he would have wanted them to be. But the supervision of
testamentary guardianships by the Court of Chancery opened up a tradition of judicial involvement in child custody that eventually would be
turned against fathers themselves.

275. Id. at 1083.
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